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DIVORCE

marily or solely liable for necessaries furnished wife, 20 A.L.R.4th 196.
Key Numbers. - Husband and Wife ..,,,,
19(10).

by juvenile court, liability of parent for, 59
A.L.R.3d 636.
Wife's liability for necessaries furnished husband, 11 A.L.R.4th 1160.
Modern status of rule that husband is pri-

30-2-10. Homestead rights -

Custody of children.

Neither the husband nor wife can remove the other or their children from
the homestead without the consent of the other, unless the owner of the property shall in good faith provide another homestead suitable to the condition in
life of the family; and if a husband or wife abandons his or her spouse, that
spouse is entitled to the custody of the minor children, unless a court of
competent jurisdiction shall otherwise direct.
Cross-References.

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1207;
C.L. 1917, § 2992; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
40-2-10; L. 1977, ch. J.-22,§ 4.

§§ 30-3-10, 30-4-3.

-

Custody of children,

(

'--..__
______ ....NOTES .TO DECISIONS
from husband to his father, this section had no
application, where it appeared that property
was jointly owned by husband and wife, and
neither resided on property. Adamson v.
Adamson, 55 Utah 544, 188 P. 635 (1920).

ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
Cited.
Applicability of section.
In action by wife for divorce and to set aside
alleged fraudulent coveyance of real property

Cited in Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d
221 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. 299½.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband
and Wife §§ 334, 532.
C.J.S. - 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 41.

Husband and Wife ..,,,,

CHAPTER 3
DIVORCE
Section
30-3-1.
30-3-2.
30-3-3.
30-3-4.
30-3-4.1.
30-3-4.2.
30-3-4.3.
30-3-4.4.
30-3-5.

Procedure
Residence
Grounds.
Right of husband to divorce.
Temporary alimony and suit
money.
Pleadings - Findings - Decree
- Sealing.
Appointment of commissioner Staff.
Authority of commissioner.
Duties of commissioner.
Jurisdiction of commissioner
Referral of cases to court.
Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties
and children - Court to have

Section

30-3-5.1.
30-3-5.2.
30-3-6.
30-3-7.
30-3-8.
30-3-9.
30-3-10.
30-3-10.1.
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continuing jurisdiction - Custody and visitation - Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
Provision for income withholding
in child support order.
Allegations of child abuse or child
sexual abuse - Investigation.
Repealed.
When decree becomes absolute.
Remarriage - When unlawful.
Repealed.
Custody of children in case of separation or divorce - Custody
consideration.
Joint legal custody defined.
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Section
30-3-10.2.
30-3-10.3.
30-3-10.4.
30-3-10.5.
30-3-10.6.
30-3-11.
30-3-11.1.
30-3-11.2.
30-3-12.
30-3-13.
30-3-13.1.
30-3-14.
30-3-14.1.
30-3-15.
30-3-15.1.

HUSBAND AND WIFE
Joint legal custody order - Factors for court determination Public assistance.
Terms of joint legal custody order.
Modification or termination of order.
Payments of support, maintenance, and alimony.
Payment under child support order - Judgment.
Repealed.
Family Court Act - Purpose.
Appointment of counsel for child.
Courts to exercise family counseling powers.
Repealed.
Establishment of family court division of district court.
Repealed.
Designation of judges - Terms.
Repealed.
Appointment of domestic relations counselors, family court
commissioner, and assistants
and clerks.

30-3-1. Procedure -

Section
30-3-15.2.
30-3-15.3.
30-3-15.4.
30-3-16.
30-3-16.1.
30-3-16.2.
30-3-16.3.
30-3-16.4.
30-3-16.5.
30-3-16.6.
30-3-16.7.
30-3-17.
30-3-17.1.
30-3-18.

30-3-19 to

Residence -

Domestic relations counselors Powers.
Commissioners - Powers.
Salaries and expenses.
Repealed.
Jurisdiction of family court division - Powers.
Petition for conciliation.
Contents of petition.
Procedure upon filing of petition.
Fees.
Information not available to public.
Effect of petition - Pendency of
action.
Power and jurisdiction of judge.
Proceedings deemed confidential
- Written evaluation by counselor.
Waiting period for hearing after
filing for divorce - Use of counseling service not to be construed as condonation.
30-3-22. Repealed.

Grounds.

(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as provided by law
for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided in this chapter.
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage contract between the
plaintiff and defendant on the grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all cases
where the plaintiff or defendant has been an actual and bona fide resident of
this state and of the county where the action is brought, or if members of the
armed forces of the United States who are not legal residents of this state,
where the plaintiff has been stationed in this state under military orders, for
three months next prior to the commencement of the action.
(3) Grounds for divorce:
(a) impotency of the defendant at the time of marriage;
(b) adultery committed by the defendant subsequent to marriage;
(c) willful desertion of the plaintiff by the defendant for more than one
year;
(d) willful neglect of the defendant to provide for the plaintiff the common necessaries of life;
(e) habitual drunkenness of the defendant;
(f) conviction of the defendant for a felony;
(g) cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant to the extent of
causing bodily injury or great mental distress to the plaintiff;
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity; or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately under a decree of
separate maintenance of any state for three consecutive years without
cohabitation.
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does not affect the
liability of either party under any provision for separate maintenance previously granted.
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(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of insanity unless: (i)
the defendant has been adjudged insane by the appropriate authorities of
this or another state prior to the commencement of the action; and (ii) the
court finds by the testimony of competent witnesses that the insanity of
the defendant is incurable.
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a guardian ad litem, who
shall protect the interests of the defendant. A copy of the summons and
complaint shall be served on the defendant in person or by publication, as
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon his
guardian ad litem, and upon the county attorney for the county where the
action is prosecuted.
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of the case and if
the defendant resides out of this state, take depositions as necessary,
attendthe proceedings, and make a defense as is just to protect the rights
of the defendant and the interests of the state.
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the defendant resides in this
state, upon notice, have the defendant brought into the court at trial, or
have an examination of the defendant by two or more competent physicians, to determine the mental condition of the defendant. For this purpose either party may have leave from the court to enter any asylum or
institution where the defendant may be confined. The costs of court in
this action shall be apportioned by the court.
History: R.S. 1898, § 1208; L. 1903, ch. 43,
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 1208; C.L. 1917, § 2995; L.
1929, ch. 93, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-1;
L. 1943, ch. 46, § 1; 1955, ch. 45, § 1; 1965,
ch. 57, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 1; 1987, ch. 106,
§ 1.

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment, effective April 1, 1987, rewrote this section.

Cross-References. - Annulment of marriage, §§ 30-1-17 to 30-1-17.4.
Conciliation petition, filing as temporary bar
to filing divorce action, § 30-3-16.7.
Family counseling services, use not condonation, § 30-3-18.
Will partially revoked by divorce, § 75-2508.
Form of complaint for divorce, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Appx. Form 18.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adultery.
Annulment.
Appeal and review.
-Moootness.
Both parties at fault.
Church divorce.
Cruel treatment.
Defenses.
Desertion.
Discretion of judge.
Divorce by mutual consent.
Estoppel.
Evidence.
-Conduct after filing of complaint.

Grounds for divorce generally.
Habitual drunkenness.
Insanity.
Jurisdiction, district courts.
Jurisdiction over nonresident.
Neglect of defendant to provide.
Pleading and evidence.
Pleading defenses.
Residence.
Venue.
Cited.
Adultery.
Circumstantial evidence held to establish
fact of adultery on part of husband. Griffin v.
Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 P. 84 (1898).
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A charge of adultery must be sustained by
clear and satisfactory proof. Holm v. Holm, 44
Utah 242, 139 P. 937 (1914).
A mere opportunity to commit adultery is
not enough to show the commission ofit. Doe v.
Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 P. 781 (1916), overruled
on other grounds, Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d
491 (Utah 1975).

Annulment.
Even though pleadings do not state cause of
action for annulment, if parties consent to litigation of issues involved in such an action, and
court hears evidence adduced thereon, court
may grant annulment, and neither party can
complain. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239,
153 P.2d 262 (1944).
Appeal and review.
Where the evidence in divorce action is conflicting, but there is sufficient evidence to support lower court's finding against defendant
wife on her counterclaim, Supreme Court will
approve it. Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah
104, 138 P.2d 252 (1943).
When a divorce decree is under attack, it is
regarded as an attack upon the whole decree
and it was not necessary for defendant specifically to attack awards of alimony and attorney's fees to have them stricken from the decree. Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187,321
P.2d 931 (1958).
-Mootness.
Appeal of the dismissal of wife's divorce suit
because she failed to satisfy the three-month
residency requirement imposed by this section
at the time her complaint was filed was moot,
where a final divorce decree had been entered,
terminating the marital relationship between
the parties. Neville v. Neville, 740 P.2d 290
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Both parties at fault.
Where reciprocal claims rest upon various
acts and .omissions alleged to constitute cruelty
to the other, and neither party is accused of the
commission of a felony, adultery or any other
heinous offense, the trial court would best perform its function in the administration of justice by determining which party was less at
fault and grant a divorce and adjust their
rights. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 178,
257 P.2d 366 (1953).
The principle that a divorce will ordinarily
not be granted where both parties are at fault
is of ancient origin and has long persisted, although in modern times it is probably true that
it has been more honored in the breach than in
the observance. Where no good purpose, either
social, moral, ethical or legal could be served
by refusing to grant a divorce and settle the
property rights of the parties because both parties are guilty spouses it would be a mockery of
the true concept of matrimony to compel two

people clearly ill-suited and maladjusted to
each other to continue to retain the legal relationship of husband and wife. Hendricks v.
Hendricks, 123 Utah 178, 257 P.2d 366 (1953).
Where both parties are guilty of mental cruelty, the one granted a divorce as less at fault
is not thereby entitled to custody of the children or to continuance of the marriage. Curry
v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 939 (1958).
Marriage may be dissolved by •making a
grant of divorce to each party where each was
equally at fault. Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah
2d 82, 485 P.2d 663 (1971).

Church divorce.
Mere fact that members of Mormon Church
who had been married by Mormon "sealing ceremony" believed that Mormon "church divorce," obtained by them, was valid, and that
wife, so believing, thereafter went through
marriage ceremony with another man, did not
dissolve "sealed" marriage. Hilton v. Roylance,
25 Utah 129, 69 P. 660, 58 L.R.A. 723, 95 Am.
St. R. 821 (1902); Stewart v. Hilton, 25 Utah
160, 69 P. 1134 (1902); In re Park's Estate, 25
Utah 161, 69 P. 671 (1902).

Cruel treatment.
"Cruel treatment causing great mental distress to the plaintiff' was established by a
showing that wife transferred her affections to
another man, stated this to others, and refused
to discontinue her manifestations of friendship
for him and her visits and associations with
him. Holm v. Holm, 44 Utah 242, 139 P. 937
(1914).
What constitutes mental cruelty must be ascertained from the facts of each case. Doe v.
Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 P. 781 (1916), overruled
on other grounds, Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d
491 (Utah 1975); Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13
Utah 2d 153, 369 P. 2d 923 (1962); Hansen v.
Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975).
In suit for divorce on ground of extreme cruelty, finding of trial court that defendant was
insane at time she committed acts of cruelty
and that plaintiff was not entitled to divorce
held not so clearly against evidence as to necessarily require reviewing court to substitute
another finding therefor. Steed v. Steed, 54
Utah 244, 181 P. 445 (1919).
Where defendant allowed his son by a former
marriage to abuse and even assault his wife,
this constitutes "cruel treatment," at least
where it is alleged and proved that defendant
made the acts his own by subsequent approval
and adoption. Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah
257, 53 P.2d 428 (1936).
Court erred in overruling demurrer to complaint in action for divorce on ground of cruelty, where incidents of cruelty alleged were
trifling matters that parties could and should
have been adjusted to. Cordner v. Cordner, 91
Utah 466, 61 P.2d 601 (1936).
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Husband's physical condition which was
found to have "caused wife to be upset and
caused her great mental distress, anguish and
great mental suffering" was not ground for divorce. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 152
P.2d 426 (1944).
Where both parties were over 70 years of age
and both were drawing old-age assistance at
time of marriage, and their inability to adjust,
lack of cooperation, financial dependency, old
age, ill-health and difficulties in hearing had
tended to magnify irritation over conduct of
each other, trial court was warranted in decreeing divorce in view of their old age and
mutual dependency, and awarding husband,
rather than wife, the divorce was upheld under
the circumstances. Lundgreen v. Lundgreen,
112 Utah 31, 184 P.2d 670 (1947).
There must exist grounds for a divorce sufficient to satisfy the requirement specifying cruelty to the extent of causing great mental distress. Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d
939 (1958).
A wife was entitled to divorce for mental cruelty where she proved that her husband's cruel
treatment caused her to suffer great mental
distress. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d
153, 369 P. 2d 923 (1962).
Husband, who had falsely accused wife of infidelity, mental and emotional disturbances,
giving him a venereal infection, and of being
paranoid, was guilty of cruel conduct especially
in light of his medical knowledge, which included considerable training in the area of
mental diseases. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13
Utah 2d 153, 369 P.2d 923 (1962).
Acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to
cause great mental distress need not be aggravated and more severe when directed toward
the husband than when directed toward the
wife. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah
1975).

Defenses.
Gross cruelty on part of plaintiff husband
will bar his right to divorce, however great
fault of defendant wife may have been.
Hartwell v. Hartwell, 25 Utah 41, 69 P. 265
(1902).
Adultery, if condoned, is not ground for divorce under this section. Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah
200, 158 P. 781 (1916), overruled on other
grounds, Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491
(Utah 1975).
In suit by wife on ground of desertion, her
act of adultery during period of desertion justified refusal to grant her decree of divorce.
Ahlborn v. Ahlborn, 59 Utah 445, 204 P. 99
(1922).
Adultery is a condonable offense. Griffiths v.
Griffiths, 3 Utah 2d 82, 278 P.2d 983 (1955).
Condonation bars a recriminatory defense as
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well as grounds for divorce action. Griffiths v.
Griffiths, 3 Utah 2d 82, 278 P.2d 983 (1955).
Desertion.
Desertion without cause and continuing to
live apart without cause are ordinarily sufficient. Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 P. 781
(1916), overruled on other grounds, Hansen v.
Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975).
Wife will be granted a judgment where desertion and nonsupport are shown to be unjustified, and no agreement to live separate and
apart is shown. Stanger v. Stanger, 72 Utah
357, 270 P. 149 (1928).
Separation to which both parties willingly
concur is not willful desertion of one by the
other. Speak v. Speak, 81 Utah 423, 19 P.2d
386 (1933).
To establish "desertion" within meaning of
Subsection (3), there must be cessation from
cohabitation continued for statutory period, intention in mind of deserter not to resume cohabitation and absence of other party's consent
to separation or misconduct justifying separation. Speak v. Speak, 81 Utah 423, 19 P.2d 386
(1933); Kidman v. Kidman, 109 Utah 81, 164
P.2d 201 (1945); Peterson v. Peterson, 112
Utah 542, 189 P.2d 961 (1948).
Term "willful," as used in Subsection (3),
means "on purpose, intentional," but does not
imply any malice or wrong toward other party.
Speak v. Speak, 81 Utah 423, 19 P. 2d 386
(1933); Kidman v. Kidman, 109 Utah 81, 164
P.2d 201 (1945); Peterson v. Peterson, 112
Utah 542, 189 P.2d 961 (1948).
Where facts indicate that the separation in
the case was originally by mutual consent, and
that such separation continued by mutual consent, a decree predicated on finding of willful
desertion for more than one year was set aside.
Kidman v. Kidman, 109 Utah 81, 164 P.2d 201
(1945).
Where wife knew, at time of marriage, kind
of labor that husband performed and that he
would have to seek work wherever he could
find it, and separation of parties began by mutual consent when husband's job terminated
and he left wife and children at home of wife's
parents while he went elsewhere to seek employment, wife was not justified thereafter in
refusing husband's requests to join and live
with him at different places where he obtained
employment on ground that she considered
such homes unsuitable, and from that time on
separation was no longer by mutual consent, so
that, as such refusal extended over period of
more than one year prior to commencement of
divorce action, trial court was justified in
granting husband divorce on ground of "willful
desertion" under this section. Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P.2d 961 (1948).
Discretion of judge.
While ordinarily, if the complaining party
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makes out a case under the statute, the court
should grant a divorce, there may be conditions
and circumstances under which the chancellor
should exercise at least a sound discretion in
granting or withholding relief and in determining the extent thereof. Under such conditions the facts and circumstances of the particular case should be permitted to control the
chancellor's conclusions. Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 (1943).

Divorce by mutual consent.
Dissolution of status of marriage cannot be
effected simply by mutual consent or agreement of parties. Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah
129, 69 P. 660, 58 L.R.A. 723, 95 Am. St. R. 821
(1902); Stewart v. Hilton, 25 Utah 160, 69 P.
1134 (1902); In re Park's Estate, 25 Utah 161,
69 P. 671 (1902).
Although husband or wife, either singly or
together, may violate terms and obligations of
marriage contract, neither spouse, either
singly or together, can rescind or modify such
contract except as provided by law. Palmer v.
Palmer, 26 Utah 31, 72 P. 3, 61 L.R.A. 641, 99
Am. St. R. 820 (1903).
Agreement between husband and wife, calculated to facilitate procuring of divorce a vinculo matrimonii, was contrary to public policy
and void. Palmer v. Palmer, 26 Utah 31, 72 P.
3, 61 L.R.A. 641, 99 Am. St. R. 820 (1903).
A party cannot make a separation, which
was begun and prolonged by common consent,
a ground for divorce, where he has made no
effort at a reconciliation, since such separation
is deemed to be with the consent of both parties. Speak v. Speak, 81 Utah 423, 19 P.2d 386
(1933).
Estoppel.
Where the husband had knowledge that
there was no legal marriage and was served
with process in the divorce action but did not
resist the action, he is estopped from later having the divorce decree vacated. Caffall v.
Caffall, 5 Utah 2d 407, 303 P.2d 286 (1956).
Evidence.
-Conduct after filing of complaint.
Evidence as to conduct subsequent to the filing of a divorce complaint is inadmissible for
the purpose of establishing grounds for divorce,
but is admissible as lending weight to and corroborating testimony as to prior acts of illtreatment and such evidence is admissible
even though, if relevant, it also proves grounds
for divorce other than that alleged. Vrontikis
v. Vrontikis, 11 Utah 2d 305, 358 P.2d 632
(1961).
Grounds for divorce generally.
Courts are not authorized to grant divorces
except for the particular causes prescribed by
law. Even then such grounds must be proved

by substantial and satisfactory evidence.
Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 P. 335
(1926), overruled on other grounds, Hansen v.
Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (1975).
Mere drifting apart because of failure to synchronize interests or ambitions is no ground for
a divorce, although it may be that the parties
cannot and should not be compelled to live together. Holman v. Holman, 94 Utah 300, 77
P.2d 329 (1938).
Grounds laid down by legislature, on which
divorce may be granted, must be present. Holman v. Holman, 94 Utah 300, 77 P.2d 329
(1938).

Habitual drunkenness.
To constitute "habitual drunkenness" as
ground for divorce, there must be a confirmed
habit of drunkenness; being occasionally drunk
does not constitute it. Holm v. Holm, 44 Utah
242, 139 P. 937 (1914).
Insanity.
In suit for divorce on ground of extreme cruelty, finding of trial court that defendant was
insane at time she committed acts of cruelty
held not so clearly against evidence as to necessarily require reviewing court to substitute
another finding therefor, expecially in view of
this provision which affords plaintiff full and
complete remedy. Steed v. Steed, 54 Utah 244,
181 P. 445 (1919).
Jurisdiction, district courts.
Requirement of this section, as amended in
1943, that plaintiff shall have been actual and
bona fide resident of state and of county
wherein divorce action is brought for three
months prior to commencement of action establishes prerequisite to district court obtaining
jurisdiction of status of marriage existing between parties in particular divorce action, and
is limitation on power of court to act in respect
to marriage contract and marriage status ensuing therefrom; if court finds that there was
actual and bona fide residence as specified, it
has power to dissolve or refuse to dissolve marriage contract dependent on merits of case, but
if it finds that there was no such residence,
court has no power to further act as to marriage contract and it exceeds its authority by so
acting. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d
1005 (1947).
Jurisdiction over nonresident.
Where, in divorce proceeding, it appears that
plaintiff husband has resided in state for full
statutory period, and that nonresident defendant wife has been served with summons, appeared in case, and surrendered herself to jurisdiction of court in which litigation originated, such court has jurisdiction over parties
and right to pass on and dispose of issues
raised between them, on merits, in accordance
with rules of equity, even if, in order to do so, it
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is necessary to grant divorce to wife on facts
stated in cross-complaint; having jurisdiction
of case and parties, court may proceed to make
such order in relation to children and property
as shall be equitable and just. Fisk v. Fisk, 24
Utah 333, 67 P. 1064 (1902).
The courts of this state have jurisdiction to
entertain an action for divorce as against a
nonresident defendant by publication of summons or other constructive service, where
"plaintiff shall have been an actual and bona
fide resident of this state," even though there
was no matrimonial domicile herein, and even
though marriage was not celebrated here, and
though defendant was not personally served
with process within the state, and no appearance was entered by him or her in the cause.
Schafer v. Ritchie, 49 Utah 111, 162 P. 618
(1916).

Neglect of defendant to provide.
The fact that parties separated did not absolve husband from duty of supporting his wife,
and did not justify him in refusing to help her
during her illness. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 56
Utah 289, 190 P. 776 (1920).
For failure to provide common necessaries of
life to be willful, it must be intentional or of
such callous neglect and indifference as to be
equivalent to an intentional failure. Holman v.
Holman, 94 Utah 300, 77 P.2d 329 (1938).
Pleading and evidence.
Before a divorce may be granted, it must be
alleged and proved that further maintenance
of the relationship is incompatible with public
policy of state, and detrimental, if cruelty is
the charge, to the health, morals or well-being
of one of the parties. Cordner v. Cordner, 91
Utah 466, 61 P.2d 601 (1936).
Pleading defenses.
Misconduct of plaintiff, affording justification for the acts complained of, must be alleged
in the answer in order to be proved in defense.
Plaintiff need not negative misconduct on his
or her part. Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257,
53 P.2d 428 (1936).
Residence.
Where husband and wife were residents of
Utah at time of marriage and until husband
abondoned wife, fiction that domicile of husband is that of wife did not apply but domicile
of matrimony remained with wife for purpose
of dissolution of marriage, and divorce would
be granted on constructive service. State ex rel.
Aldrach v. Morse, 31 Utah 213, 87 P. 705
(1906).
Husband has right to establish family domicile, or to change it, and it is duty of wife to
follow him, where he requests it and furnishes
her necessary means to follow him. Speak v.
Speak, 81 Utah 423, 19 P.2d 386 (1933).
Where allegation of residence was admitted
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in answer, testimony on matter, although
sketchy, was undisputed, and case was otherwise contested, trial court's finding that plaintiff was resident was not disturbed. Kidman v.
Kidman, 109 Utah 81, 164 P.2d 201 (1945).
In divorce action, domicile is inherent element upon which jurisdiction must rest, and
domicile of at least one of parties is sine qua
non to jurisdiction in such action. Weiss v.
Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
In Utah, old basis of "matrimonial domicile"
as condition for jurisdiction of "matrimonial
res" or "marital status" has given way to "unitary domicile" as basis of jurisdiction. Weiss v.
Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
Trial court in divorce action may postpone
its determination of question of residence required by this section until all evidence is in,
in which case evidence of witnesses taken under oath would be preserved and could be read
into the record on retrial under former
§ 104-51-16, Code 1943, upon reversal of finding of insufficient residence and departure of
witnesses from state before retrial. Weiss v.
Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
In divorce proceedings, question of whether
plaintiff was an "actual and bona fide resident"
of county where action was brought for period
prescribed by this section was essentially one
of fact. Gardner v. Gardner, 118 Utah 496,222
P.2d 1055 (1950).
Whether a person is an "actual" resident is a
factual matter determinable at the trial court
level and, in a case involving a question of jurisdiction based on the requirement of "actual
and bona fide residence," where the discussion
as to the question of residence did not find its
way into the printed record, the case was remanded for further fact finding. Munsee v.
Munsee, 12 Utah 2d 83, 363 P. 2d 71 (1961).
An alien, present in this jurisdiction under a
temporary nonimmigrant visa, is not precluded
as a matter of law from fulfilling the residency
requirements of the divorce statute; even if
alien's professed intention to establish an actual and bona fide residency is inconsistent
with_ the terms of her right of entry into the
United States, she is not thereby disqualified
from becoming a domiciliary for divorce purposes. Bustamante v. Bustamante, 645 P.2d 40
(Utah 1982).

Venue.
In an action brought to modify a foreign divorce decree, this section did not apply to give
plaintiff option to bring the action in the
county of his residence, and venue for the action was proper in the county where the defendant resided and the cause of action arose,
which was the same county. Angell v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court, 656 P.2d 405 (Utah 1982).
Cited in Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369
(Utah 1988).
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Utah Law Review. - The Utah Marriage
Counseling Experiment: An Account of
Changes in Divorce Law and Procedure,
Bodenheimer, 7 Utah L. Rev. 443 (1961).
Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation §§ 25-164, 232-258.
C.J.S. - 27A C.J.S. Divorce§§ 14 to 70, 96
to 109.
A.L.R. - Bigamy: construction of statute
making bigamy or prior lawful subsisting marriage to third person a ground for divorce, 3
A.L.R.3d 1108.
Cruelty: single act as basis of divorce or separation on ground of cruelty, 7 A.L.R.3d 761.
Jurisdiction of action involving matrimonial
disputes, assumption or denial of, 9 A.L.R.3d
545.
Service of process: jurisdiction on constructive or substituted service, in divorce or alimony action, to reach property within state, 10
A.L.R.3d 212.
Mutual fault: power of court to grant absolute divorce to both spouses upon showing of
mutual fault, 13 A.L.R.3d 1343.
Domestic recognition of divorce decree obtained in foreign country and attacked for lack
of domicile or jurisdiction of parties, 13
A.L.R.3d 1419.
Separation as substantive ground of divorce,
fault of spouse as affecting right to divorce under statute making, 14 A.L.R.3d 502.
Power of court to award absolute divorce in
favor of party who desires only limited decree,
or vice versa, 14 A.L.R.3d 703.
Dismissal: right of one spouse, over objection, to voluntarily dismiss claim for divorce,
annulment, or similar marital relief, 16
A.L.R.3d 283.
Retrospective effect of statute prescribing
grounds of divorce, 23 A.L.R.3d 626.
Separation within statute making separation a substantive ground for divorce, 35
A.L.R.3d 1238.
Local order previously entered for separate
maintenance, foreign divorce as affecting, 49
A.L.R.3d 1266.

Residence or domicile within state by citizen
of another county for purpose of jurisdiction in
divorce, what constitutes, 51 A.L.R.3d 223.
"No-fault" divorce statutes providing for dissolution of marriage upon finding that relationship is no longer viable, validity, construction, and effect of, 55 A.L.R.3d 581.
Residence: validity of statute imposing durational residency requirements for divorce applicants, 57 A.L.R.3d 221.
Wills: divorce as affecting will previously executed by husband or wife, 71 A.L.R.3d 1297.
Jurisdiction of court for purpose of divorce
for servicemen, validity and construction of
statutory provision relating to, 73 A.L.R.3d
431.
Sexual intercourse, refusal as justifying divorce or separation, 82 A.L.R.3d 660.
Transvestism or transsexualism of spouse as
justifying divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d 725.
Contract between husband or wife and third
person promotive of divorce or separation,
what constitutes, 93 A.L.R.3d 523.
"Incompatibility" within statute specifying
it as substantive ground for divorce, what constitutes, 97 A.L.R.3d 989.
Modern status of views as to validity of premarital agreements contemplating divorce or
separation, 53 A.L.R.4th 22.
Enforceability of premarital agreements
governing support or property rights upon divorce or separation as affected by circumstances surrounding execution - modern status, 53 A.L.R.4th 85.
Enforceability of premarital agreements
governing support or property rights upon divorce or separation as affected by fairness or
adequacy of those terms - modern status, 53
A.L.R.4th 161.
Right to jury trial in state court divorce proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.
Lis pendens as applicable to suit for separation or dissolution of marriage, 65 A.L.R.4th
522.
Key Numbers. - Divorcee=- 12-38, 57-65.

30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife for the same
causes and in the same manner as the wife may obtain a divorce from her
husband.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1209;
C.L. 1917, § 2997; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
40-3-2.
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Both parties at fault.
Cruel treatment.
Both parties at fault.
Marriage may be dissolved by making a
grant of divorce to each party where each was
equally at fault. Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah
2d 82, 485 P.2d 663 (1971).

Cruel treatment.
Acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to
cause great mental distress need not be aggravated and more severe when directed toward
the ~usband than when directed toward the
wife. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah
1975).

30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money.
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk a sum of money for the
separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and
to enable such party to prosecute or defend the action.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1210;
C.L. 1917, § 2998; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
40-3-3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appealability of order.
Appeal from order.
Attorney fees.
Attorney fees for appeal.
Attorney's lien on alimony.
Contempt proceedings.
Contesting petitioner for modification.
Costs and expenses on appeal.
Discretion of trial court.
Enforcement of order or decree.
Jurisdiction.
Mandamus.
Order of court.
Stipulation and effect thereof.
Appealability of order.
Formal order made in divorce action, called a
"judgment" directing that judgment be entered
for benefit of defendant's attorneys, is not final
and appealable. Rolando v. District Court, 72
Utah 459, 271 P. 225 (1928).
Appeal from order.
Where there were no findings or evidence in
record as to attorney's fees, Supreme Court remanded issue for disposition by trial court but
allowed wife's attorney $100 for services rendered with reference to husband's appeal from
judgment modifying divorce decree. Parish v.
Parish, 84 Utah 390, 35 P.2d 999 (1934).
Supreme Court assumed that evidence supported award of suit money to wife where no
testimony as to wife's need was before the
court on appeal on judgment roll from the decree of no cause of action in husband and
awarding of expenses of suit, attorney's fees

and temporary alimony to wife. Weiss v. Weiss,
111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).

Attorney fees.
Allowance of $200 as wife's attorney's fee in
divorce proceeding was not inadequate even
though husband was worth approximately
$40,000, where proceedings from time of commencement until entry of decree lasted less
than two months and trial itself was completed
in less than two days. Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah
306, 121 P. 19, 38 L.R.A. (n.s.) 269, 1914D
Ann. Cas. 989 (1912).
Where decree of divorce was obtained by
mother of minor children against father, who
was required to pay certain sum periodically
for support, care, maintenance, and education
of such children, and he, without sufficient
cause, refused to comply with decree, as result
of which mother was compelled to bring proceedings against him, father was required to
pay counsel fees in such proceedings. Tribe v.
Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921).
Court properly awarded attorney's fees to
wife in subsequent proceeding on application of
wife for arrears in alimony. Christensen v.
Christensen, 65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925).
Fifty dollars was a reasonable fee where wife
petitioned to require husband to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt for
failure to pay support money and husband filed
cross-petition for modification of decree and
where it was shown that wife was without
means to prosecute the cause or pay counsel.
Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P.2d 198
(1943).
While fact that wife is able to pay expenses
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of defending husband's divorce suit or to obtain
credit therefor should be considered by court in
determining whether to make award for expenses of suit and amount thereof, such fact
alone does not show that award is unjustified,
and consequently fact that award to wife for
expenses of defending suit was made after expenses were paid or credit extended therefor
did not render award erroneous as showing
that she had no need therefor. Weiss v. Weiss,
111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
It was an abuse of discretion for trial court to
award attorney fees to mother in child custody
modification proceeding where there was no
presentation of facts establishing her financial
need for such an award. Kallas v. Kallas, 614
P.2d 641 (Utah 1980).
Although there was no detailed presentation
of facts establishing the usual requisite factors
to support an award of attorney's fees, trial
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
attorney fees to plaintiff to enable her to prosecute an action to enforce a provision of the divorce decree where the facts implicit in the
proceeding and the evidence necessarily presented to the trial court, together with the de
minimis nature of the award, constituted a sufficient basis to sustain the exercise of trial
court's discretion. Beardall v. Beardall, 629
P.2d 425 (Utah 1981).
Trial court properly denied wife's request for
attorney fees in divorce proceeding where she
offered no evidence at trial to show the nature
or amount of any attorney fees incurred or any
need for court-ordered assistance in the payment of such fees. Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d
684 (Utah 1982).
In divorce cases, an award of attorney's fees
must be supported by evidence which shows
that the requested award is reasonable and
which establishes the financial need of the
party requesting the award; relevant factors of
reasonableness include the necessity of the
number of hours dedicated; the reasonableness
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of
the case and the result accomplished, and the
rates commonly charged for divorce actions in
the community. Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862
(Utah 1984); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). -~
An award of attorney fees to the wife was
reasonable where the evidence showed that the
wife needed assistance, the husband had initiated the divorce proceedings, requiring the
wife to hire an attorney, the husband was very
well supported by his family, and the wife had
worked for only four months before the couple
separated. Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387
(Utah 1985).
An award of attorney fees was proper where
the record showed the wife's need based upon
the fact that her monthly expenses exceeded

her monthly income and the attorney testified
to the reasonableness of his fees. Sinclair v.
Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396 (Utah 1986).
The decision to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings rests primarily in the sound
discretion of the trial court. However, the
award must be based on evidence of both financial need and reasonableness. Rasband v.
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Attorney fees for appeal.
Ex-husband who unsuccessfully appealed
trial court's ruling on an alimony reduction action was required to pay the appeal costs and
ex-wife's attorney fees for defending on appeal.
Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978).
Attorney's lien on alimony.
Where wife in divorce action agreed to pay
fee to attorney who was allowed reasonable fee
payable by husband, and attorney had order
entered requiring husband to pay alimony to
clerk of court to be withdrawn by wife or her
attorney, and attorney in accordance with his
claim of lien withdrew balance of his fee from
alimony paid to clerk, court order requiring
him to return such money was void, since attorney had lien on alimony, and wife was liable
for his fee even in absence of special agreement. Hampton v. Hampton, 85 Utah 338, 39
P.2d 703 (1935).
Contempt proceedings.
In contempt proceeding for failure to comply
with divorce decree, findings that husband had
not paid realty taxes and had not paid plaintiff
amount allowed for attorney's fees were insufficient to support adjudication of contempt,
since decree said nothing about taxes and provided for payment of attorney's fees to attorney. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42
P.2d 191 (1935).
Contesting petition for modification.
A reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded
a wife who contests a modification petition
where the custody of children is involved. Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d
264 (1962).
Costs and expenses on appeal.
The Supreme Court may determine whether
additional counsel fees should be allowed, and
may allow costs of appeal to appellant, such as
filing fees, printing costs and the like.
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157,292 P. 214
(1930).
Upon appeal by defendant husband from
judgment that he was in arrears of alimony
and in which he sought modification of decree,
wife, who was allowed $25 for expense of printing brief on appeal, was allowed further sum of
$100 as costs, including her attorney's fees.
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Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 564, 65 P.2d
642 (1937).
Wife was entitled to allowance for expenses
incurred on her appeal from judgment granting husband divorce, including reasonable attorney fees, where wife was not working, had
no means of her own and had been partially
supported by her parents for number of years.
Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P.2d
961 (1948).

Discretion of trial court.
Allowance of alimony and expenses of divorce trial, including attorneys' fees, are
largely matters within discretion of court
which tries case. Burtt v. Burtt, 59 Utah 457,
204 P. 91 (1922).
The reasonableness of the amount of the attorney's fee is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court. Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932).
Allowance of temporary alimony and suit
money is based on necessity of recipient, and
such allowance as well as amount thereof is
largely matter within sound discretion of trial
court. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d
1005 (1947).
This section does not contemplate that
awards for expenses of suit or for temporary
alimony should be made only in those cases
where "adverse party" (usually wife) is destitute or practically so, but contemplates such
awards when, in sound discretion of court, circumstances of parties are such that in fairness
to wife she should be given financial assistance
by her husband in her prosecution or defense of
divorce action, and for her support during its
pendency. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179
P.2d 1005 (1947).
Enforcement of order or decree.
Enforcement, by citation or an order to show
cause or by contempt proceedings, of orders or
decrees with respect to payment of monthly or
other specific periods of alimony and counsel
fees, for a failure and willful refusal to pay
same, is one of the inherent equity powers of
the court. Herzog v. Bramel, 82 Utah 216, 23
P.2d 345 (1933).
Jurisdiction.
Fact that district court had no jurisdiction of
status of marriage between parties to husband's divorce action, because of noncompliance with residence requirement of § 30-3-1,
had no effect on and did not preclude award to
wife for temporary alimony, expenses of suit
and attorney's fees. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah
353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
Mandamus.
District court had jurisdiction of petition
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seeking enforcement of payment of alimony
and counsel fees as required by divorce decree,
and court's view that it had no jurisdiction
until determination of validity of alleged settlement was improper, so that mandamus issued to compel court to proceed with the cause.
Herzog v. Bramel, 82 Utah 216, 23 P.2d 345
(1933).
If order to show cause is improperly refused,
the judge may be required by peremptory writ
of mandate to issue such order. Mann v. Morrison, 102 Utah 282, 130 P.2d 286 (1942).
Where defendant wife brings a proceeding
for writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of
an order to show cause why plaintiff husband
should not pay temporary alimony, suit money
and attorney's fees, the Supreme Court may
make a determination of the sufficiency of the
allegations to require the order. Anderson v.
Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 (1943).

Order of court.
An order directing payment of attorney's
fees to plaintiff's attorney is void, because it
runs in favor of the attorney, who is not a party
to the action or proceeding. Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932).
Upon a proper application, lower court will
issue an order as a matter of course to plaintiff
husband to show cause why he should not pay
temporary alimony, suit money and attorney
fees. But where motion was denied, Supreme
Court will not examine affidavits in support of
motion to see whether a sufficient showing was
made, at least where there is no showing that
the refusal to grant the order was prejudicial.
Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d
252 (1943).
Stipulation and effect thereof.
Where husband, by stipulation prior to trial
in his divorce action, recognized wife's right to
temporary alimony and agreed to $50 per
month or such greater sum as court might fix,
trial court did not err in awarding temporary
alimony, at end of trial, in amount of $75 per
month from commencement of action to entry
of decree. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179
P.2d 1005 (1947).
Fact that stipulation between parties prior
to trial in divorce action by husband provided
for latter to pay $100 as attorney's fees to enable wife to defend action did not preclude trial
court from awarding additional sum therefor,
even at end of trial after legal services had
been rendered, since wife did not agree to receive stipulated amount as complete and final
settlement of all her claims for attorney's fees.
Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005
(1947).
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Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation §§ 558-623.
C.J.S. - 27B C.J.S. Divorce §§ 305-368.
A.L.R. - Contract, provision thereof, or
stipulation waiving wife's right to counsel fees
in event of divorce or separation action, 3
A.L.R.3d 716.
Notice: necessity and sufficiency of notice
and hearing as to allowance of suit money or
counsel fees in divorce or other marital action,
10 A.L.R.3d 280.
Adverse judgment: wife's right to award of
counsel fees in final divorce judgment of trial
or appellate court as affected by fact that judgment was rendered against her, 32 A.L.R.3d
1227.
Amount of attorneys' fees in matters involving domestic relations, 59 A.L.R.3d 152.

30-3-4. Pleadings -

Wife's possession of independent means as
affecting her right to alimony pendente lite, 60
A.L.R.3d 728.
Authority of divorce court to award prospective or anticipated attorneys' fees to enable
parties to maintain or defend divorce suit, 22
A.L.R.4th 407.
Adequacy or excessiveness of amount of
money awarded as temporary alimony, 26
A.L.R.4th 1218.
Right to attorneys' fees in proceeding, after
absolute divorce, for modification of child custody or support order, 57 A.L.R.4th 710.
Power to modify spousal support award for a
limited term, issued in conjunction with divorce, so as to extend the term or make the
award permanent, 62 A.L.R.4th 180.
Key Numbers. - Divorce - 208-229.

Findings -

Decree -

Sealing.

The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs
attorney. No decree of divorce may be granted upon default or otherwise,
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause, and all hearings and trials for
divorce shall be held only before the court, except that the family court commissioner, upon designation by the presiding judge to serve as a judge pro
tempore, master, or referee, and with the agreement of the parties, may hear
an uncontested divorce action. The court or the commissioner in all divorce
cases shall make and file findings and decree upon the evidence. The file,
except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by the court upon the written
request of either party and upon payment of a $5 fee, and available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of
record, or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of
Recovery Services (if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving
public assistance), the commissioner, or the court, have full access to the
entire record. This sealing does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce the
decree or amend its terms.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L.
1909, ch. 60, § l; C.L. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § l; 1961,
ch. 59, § l; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116,
§ l; 1985, ch. 151, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amendment substituted "may'' for "shall" and "held
only" for "had" in the second sentence; deleted
"and not before a master, referee or any other
delegated representative" before "except that"
in the second sentence; deleted "in a case
where there has been a bona fide effort to effect
a reconciliation and a domestic relations counselor has filed a report that a reconciliation of
the parties cannot be effected" after "except

that" in the second sentence; deleted "written"
before "agreement" in the second sentence; inserted "or the commissioner" in the third sentence; deleted "court" before "file" in the fourth
sentence; substituted "the commissioner, or the
court, shall have" for "and the court, have" in
the fifth sentence; deleted "court" before
"record" in the fifth sentence; substituted "This
sealing does" for "Such sealing shall" in the
last sentence; deleted "thereof' at the end of
the section; and made minor changes in phraseology.
Cross-References. - Public may be excluded from trial, § 78-7-4.
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Claim for arrearage not enforceable.
Complaint.
Death of party.
Decree must be consistent with findings.
Determination on appeal.
Findings.
Former adjudication or res judicata.
Judge pro tempore.
Judgment or decree must be based on pleadings and evidence.
Liability for support under prior judgment.
Modification of decree.
Opening, amending and vacating decree.
Stipulations.
Claim for arrearage not enforceable.
Temporary alimony and support money
granted wife by order which was set aside by
trial court because of disabling accident to husband could not later be collected as arrearage
since decree of modification had not been appealed and there was no basis in law for enforcing claim. Eskelson v. Eskelson, 528 P.2d 1186
(Utah 1974).

Complaint.
Divorce complaint, alleging cruelty, which is
not in ordinary and concise language and is
uncertain and ambiguous should be dismissed.
Benson v. Benson, 45 Utah 514, 146 P. 564
(1915).
In an action for divorce, where a dissolution
of the marriage is the subject of the action and
the property and property rights of the parties
but an incident thereto, if complaint is so
wanting in facts as not to state a cause of action for divorce, it cannot be converted into one
to cancel a conveyance, or to restrain one of the
parties from disposing of property theretofore
conveyed by plaintiff to defendant, or to quiet
title to the property in one as against the other.
Benson v. Benson, 45 Utah 514, 146 P. 564
(1915).
A complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action where it alleged mental
cruelty in that defendant husband "beat one of
the children over the head with his fist; abused
respondent and called her vile and abusive
names in the presence of the children; accused
her of being unfaithful in the presence of the
children, all of which caused her mental pain
and suffering." The court stressed the fact that
the foregoing acts were done in the presence of
two minor children, both of whom were old
enough to understand what was being said and
done. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 152
P.2d 426 (1944).
Although the pleadings in an action for divorce do not state a cause of action for annulment, yet if the findings of fact and conclusions

of law would support such a decree, and indicate that the parties joined issues at the trial
on various matters not encompassed by the
pleadings, it will be assumed on appeal that
the matters covered by the court's findings
were litigated by consent. Jenkins v. Jenkins,
107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944).

Death of party.
Where husband died after court orally announced that it was granting a divorce but before the divorce decree was signed and entered,
court did not have authority to sign and enter
the decree nunc pro tune as of a date prior to
husband's death; death of one of the parties
before final judgment terminates the marriage
relationship and abates the divorce proceeding.
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
Decree must be consistent with findings.
Where divorce was granted to plaintiff wife,
portions of decree awarding her $25 permanent
alimony and awarding custody of minor children to husband were inconsistent with findings that wife had been deserted by husband
willfully and without just cause or excuse and
that husband was financially able to support
wife and children. Stover v. Stover, 24 Utah
92, 66 P. 766 (1901).
Determination -on appeal.
Fact findings in divorce action must support
judgment rendered therein, and, if it affirmatively appears that they fail to do so, judgment
will be reversed on appeal. Karren v. Karren,
25 Utah 87, 69 P. 465, 60 L.R.A. 294, 95 Am.
St. R. 815 (1902).
A decree of divorce supported by clear preponderance of evidence cannot be disturbed on
appeal. Stewart v. Stewart, 66 Utah 366, 242
P. 947 (1926).
The Supreme Court is reluctant to modify a
divorce decree because usually the evidence is
contradictory and the trial court, having seen
and heard the witnesses, is in a better position
to determine their credibility. Lawlor v.
Lawlor, 121 Utah 201, 240 P.2d 271 (1952).
Findings.
The findings by the district court should be
specific and in conformity with the allegations
of the complaint. Johnson v. Johnson, 107
Utah 147, 152 P.2d 426 (1944).
. If all the evidence in a divorce case is before
the Supreme Court it may make findings if
none were entered by the district court. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 152 P.2d 426
(1944).
Fact that trial court erroneously found that
willful desertion on part of wife commenced on
certain date when parties separated by mutual
consent did not invalidate judgment granting
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husband divorce on ground of willful desertion
under § 30-3-1, where evidence was sufficient
to sustain finding that wife willfully deserted
husband for more than one year subsequent to
such date. Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 542,
189 P.2d 961 (1948).
Former adjudication or res judicata.
Judgment on merits dismissing wife's suit
for divorce on ground of cruelty held conclusive
and final in subsequent suit by wife for divorce
on grounds of desertion and cruelty. Ahlborn v.
Ahlborn, 59 Utah 445, 204 P. 99 (1922).
Judge pro tempore.
Appointment of judge pro tempore to hear
divorce case does not violate this statute, since
appointment, in accord with constitution and
laws of Utah, makes pro tempore judge equal
in every respect to regular judge, and orders he
makes are binding upon parties and cannot be
set aside unless reversed upon appeal.
Harward v. Harward, 526 P.2d 1183 (Utah
1974).
Judgment or decree must be based on
pleadings and evidence.
Whenever parties are before court, and
pleadings are sufficient to support decree, and
degree of proof necessary to convince court that
there are sufficient grounds named and relied
upon is present, party awarded divorce has absolute right to divorce decree. Rasmussen v.
Call, 55 Utah 597, 188 P. 275 (1920).
Where evidence is sufficient to sustain
charge of willful nonsupport, and it is apparent
from evidence that it is settleg purpose of husband not to support his wife, court may not
arbitrarily refuse to grant divorce. Stevenson
v. Stevenson, 56 Utah 289, 190 P. 776 (1920).
In divorce action in which defendant wife
counterclaimed for separate maintenance, no
divorce could be granted where plaintiff failed
to establish his charges, and wife, although she
was entitled to divorce, did not desire one,

since she could not be coerced into assuming
status she declined to enter. Cawley v. Cawley,
59 Utah 80, 202 P. 10 (1921).
Judgment granting plaintiff a divorce on
ground of willful neglect to provide common
necessaries of life was not sustained by the evidence, where there was no doubt that there
was no willful failure to provide. Holman v.
Holman, 94 Utah 300, 77 P.2d 329 (1938).
Liability for support under prior judgment.
An ex parte divorce decree did not supersede
a prior separate maintenance decree, and the
divorce decree against a husband did not relieve him from liability for the payment of support money under a prior separate maintenance judgment. Allred v. Allred, 12 Utah 2d
325, 366 P.2d 478 (1961).
Modification of decree.
An order modifying an important provision
of a divorce decree must be accompanied by
written findings to support such order. Shioji v.
Shioji, 671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983).
Opening, amending and vacating decree.
Where vacation of divorce decree, obtained
by collusion, is sought by party who was willing participant in fraud, court, on principle of
maxim "ex dolo malo non oritur actio," will
refuse to disturb decree, especially when other
party has remarried and children have been
born of second marriage. Karren v. Karren, 25
Utah 87, 69 P. 465, 60 L.R.A. 294, 95 Am. St.
R. 815 (1902).
Stipulations.
Where evidence presented at divorce trial
was sufficient to justify trial court's finding of
mental cruelty, it was harmless error for the
trial court to request the parties to stipulate
that sufficient grounds for divorce were made
out without proceeding further. Barrett v. Barrett, 17 Utah 2d 1, 403 P.2d 649 (1965).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation §§ 274 et seq., 421.
C.J.S. 27A C.J.S. Divorce §§ 143,
230-233.
A.L.R. - Power of court to vacate decree of
divorce or separation upon request of both parties, 3 A.L.R.3d 1216.
Power of court to award absolute divorce in

favor of party who desires only limited decree,
or vice versa, 14 A.L.R.3d 703.
Nunc pro tune: entering judgment or decree
of divorce nunc pro tune, 19 A.L.R.3d 648.
Vacating or setting aside divorce decree after remarriage of party, 17 A.L.R.4th 1153.
Necessity that divorce court value property
before distributing it, 51 A.L.R.4th 11.
Key Numbers. - Divorce ea> 88, 152.
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30-3-4.1. Appointment

of commissioner

-

Staff.

(1) The Judicial Council shall, when deemed necessary and as funded by
the Legislature, by administrative order appoint an attorney of recognized
ability and standing at the bar, or a circuit court judge, to serve as court
commissioner, and other persons as assistants and clerks as necessary to serve
during the pleasure of the appointing power.
(2) Court commissioners appointed pursuant to this section may serve in
one or more judicial districts as designated by the judicial council. Salaries of
persons appointed under this section shall be fixed within budgetary limitations as provided by Subsection 78-3-25(2). Office space, furnishings, equipment, and supplies for court commissioners shall be provided by the board of
county commissioners. The salaries and benefits of court commissioner and
their assistants shall be paid from an appropriation made by the legislature
for this purpose.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-4.1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 151, § 2.

Cross-References. - Court commissioners,
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 3-201.

30-3-4.2. Authority of commissioner.
The court commissioner may:
(1) require the personal appearance of parties and their counsel, upon
•
notice;
(2) require the filing of financial disclosure statements and proposed
settlement forms by the parties;
(3) obtain child custody evaluations from the Division of Family Services or the private sector under Subsection 55-15b-6(11);
(4) make recommendations to the court regarding any issue in domestic relations and spouse abuse cases at any stage of proceedings;
(5) keep records, compile statistics, and make reports as the courts may
direct;
(6) require counsel for the parties to file with the initial or responsive
pleadings a certificate based upon the facts available at that time if there
is:
(a) an issue of child custody anticipated;
(b) a significant financial or property issue to be adjudicated;
(c) legal action pending or previously adjudicated, in a district
court or a juvenile court of any state regarding the minor children in
the current case.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-4.2, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 151, § 3.
Compiler's Notes. - Subsection (11) of
§ 55-15b-6, referred to in Subsection (3), was

repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407. The
present comparable provision is Subsection
(10) of § 62A-4-106.
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30-3-4.3. Duties of commissioner.
Under the general supervision of the presiding judge and within the policies
established by the judges of the district, the court commissioner has the following duties and authority prior to any matters of divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, child custody, or spouse abuse coming before the district
court:
(1) review all pleadings in each case;
(2) certify those cases directly to the court which do not appear to
require further intervention by the commissioner;
(3) conduct hearings with parties and their counsel present, except
those previously certified to the court, for the purpose of submitting recommendations to the court;
(4) provide any other information or assistance to the parties as appropriate;
(5) coordinate information with the juvenile court regarding previous
or pending proceedings involving children of the parties;
(6) refer appropriate cases to mediation programs where available;
(7) adjudicate default divorces.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-4.3, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 151, § 4.

30-3-4.4. Jurisdiction of commissioner - Referral of cases
to court.
(1) All domestic relations matters, including orders to show cause, pretrial
conferences, petitions for modification of a divorce decree, scheduling conferences, and all other applications for relief, except ex parte motions, shall be
referred to the court commissioner before any hearing may be scheduled before the district court judge, unless otherwise ordered.
(2) The court commissioner shall, after hearing any motion or other application for relief, recommend entry of an order, and shall make a written
recommendation as to each matter heard. Should the parties not consent to
the recommended order, the matter shall be referred for further disposition by
a district judge.
(3) Any party objecting to the recommended order or seeking further hearing before a district judge shall, within ten days of the entry of the commissioner's recommendations, provide notice to the commissioner's office and opposing counsel that the recommended order is not acceptable or that further
hearing is desired. The commissioner shall then refer the matter to a district
judge for further hearing, conference, or trial. If no objection or request for
further hearing is made within ten days, the party is deemed to have consented to entry of an order in conformance with the commissioner's recommendation.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-4.4, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 151, § 5.
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30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health
care of parties and children - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and visitation Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment ofreasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in
good faith.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975,ch.81, § 1; 1979,ch. 110,§ 1; 1984,ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amendment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1);

added Subsection (2); designated two undesignated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4);
inserted "In determining" and "the court" in
Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); divided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substituting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless
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that marriage"; substituted "payment of' for
"in which case" in Subsection (5); substituted
"terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony" for "shall be terminated upon
application of that party establishing" in Subsection (6); divided Subsection (6) into two sentences, substituting "However, if' for "unless";
deleted "between them" after "association" in
Subsection (6); added "payment of alimony
shall resume" in Subsection (6); and made
minor changes in phraseology.
The 1985 amendment by Chapter 100 re-

wrote Subsection (1); designated two undesignated paragraphs as Subsections (2) and (3);
made identical changes in Subsections (2) and
(3) as those made to Subsections (3) and (4) by
Laws 1985, Chapter 72; redesignated former
Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (4) and
(5); made identical changes in Subsections (4)
and (5) as those made to Subsections (5) and (6)
by Laws 1985, Chapter 72; added Subsection
(6); and made minor changes in phraseology.
Cross-References. - Grandparents' visitation rights, § 30-5-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Alimony.
-Amount.
-Modification.
-Remarriage.
-Residing with opposite sex.
-Source.
-Termination.
-Waiver.
Appeal and review.
Attorney fees.
Bankruptcy.
-Effect upon divorce decree.
Children.
-Custody.
--Choice
of child.
--Modification.
-Jurisdiction.
-Support.
--Age
to which support due.
--Amount.
--Death
of father.
--Failure
to pay.
--Modification.
--Waiver
by mother.
Contempt proceedings.
Continuing jurisdiction.
Costs.
Court's powers and jurisdiction.
Foreign decrees.
Foreign laws.
Injunctions.
Death during pendency of divorce.
Declaratory judgment.
Disqualification of judge.
Interest on installment payments.
Laches and estoppel.
Lien of decree.
Life insurance.
Modification of decree generally.
Property division.
-Advanced degrees.
-Antenuptial
agreement.
-Cohabitation.
-Contributions.
-Discretion of court.

-Evidence.
-Homestead right.
-House.
-Inheritances.
-Modification.
--Spouses'
earning capacity.
-Reimbursement.
-Retirement funds.
-Time of valuation.
Res judicata.
Retention of jurisdiction.
Right of action.
Statute of limitations.
Stipulations and agreements of parties.
Suit to set aside fraudulent conveyance.
Trustee for wife.
Visitation rights.
Voluntary support payments.
Cited.

Alimony.
"Alimony" is allowance which husband, by
order of court, pays to his wife, living separate
from him, for her maintenance. Hoagland v.
Hoagland, 19 Utah 103, 57 P. 20 (1899).
Husband is not entitled to alimony, or allowance out of property of wife, except as provided
by statute. Hoagland v. Hoagland, 19 Utah
103, 57 P. 20 (1899).
Awarding of alimony and amount thereof
are within sound discretion of trial court, and,
unless it is made to appear that there has been
an abuse of discretion on part of court in dealing with these questions, its judgment and orders granting and fixing alimony will not be
disturbed. Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 306, 121 P.
19, 38 L.R.A. (n.s.) 269, 1914D Ann. Cas. 989
(1912); Adamson v. Adamson, 55 Utah 544,
188 P. 635 (1920).
In action by wife for divorce and alimony,
where wife had business which provided her
with living, and husband was addicted to drink
and had no business or property, trial court did
not abuse its discretion in withholding alimony. Adamson v. Adamson, 55 Utah 544,188
P. 635 (1920).
Where wife obtained divorce from husband
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by service of publication while he was in another state, and it was impossible to have her
right to alimony adjudicated as court was without jurisdiction, she had right to have such
question determined in independent action for
alimony in which husband could contest merits
of divorce to defeat alimony. Hutton v. Dodge,
58 Utah 228, 198 P. 165 (1921). It would be
otherwise, however, where husband was in the
jurisdiction and served with process; see Cody
v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952 (1916).
While awarding of alimony and fixing
amount thereof are within sound discretion of
trial court, such discretion is not arbitrary, and
award or refusal to award is subject to correction on appeal if it is erroneous on its face or
unjust to either party. Friedli v. Friedli, 65
Utah 605, 238 P. 647 (1925).
Where wife was granted divorce and husband had property of value of$2,500 while wife
had nothing, denial of alimony to wife and
awarding all property to husband was error.
Friedli v. Friedli, 65 Utah 605, 238 P. 647
(1925).
The problem of alimony and division of property must rest upon the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. Dahlberg v.
Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214 (1930);
Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d
277 (1936), modified, 91 Utah 564, 65 P.2d 642
(1937); Allen v. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 P.2d
872 (1946).
Payments from father to children as result of
fatherly interest in their welfare are not entitled to credit as payments of alimony.
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42 P.2d
191 (1935).
A wife does not necessarily forfeit her right
to alimony by conduct entitling the husband to
a divorce. Therefore, even though the decree is
in favor of the defendant husband, there would
be no abuse of discretion in making a suitable
allowance for the plaintiff, even if she were
guilty as charged in the cross-complaint or
counterclaim. Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah
257, 53 P.2d 428 (1936).
The basis and reason for allowing alimony to
the wife is to repay her for the years spent in
caring for the household and helping the husband in building up his property, and to enable
her to live after the husband's support is taken
away from her; or in certain cases to recompense her as far as material recompense will do
so for injuries or abuse to her person or impairment of health brought on by conduct or cruelty of the husband during coverture. Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252
(1943).
Where wife failed, in husband's successful
divorce suit, to ask for any alimony in her
amended answer and counterclaim for divorce,
trial court did not err in failing to grant her
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alimony under circumstances of case. Peterson
v. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P.2d 961 (1948).
In husband's action to vacate alimony award
on ground that parties were never legally married since their alleged marriage occurred during interlocutory period of wife's prior divorce,
husband had duty to establish the invalidity of
the marriage "by evidence which negatives the
effective operation of every possible means by
which a dissolution of such prior marriage
could have been effected." Anderson v. Anderson, 121 Utah 237, 240. P.2d 966 (1952).
Fact that wife has property or the means to
support herself does not in itself preclude an
allowance of alimony. Frank v. Frank, 585
P.2d 453 (Utah 1978).
Lump sum award as security for monthly alimony obligation was required to be conditioned
so as to allow such award to revert to the obligor upon the termination of his alimony obligation. Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah
1982).
An award of lump sum alimony included in
the property settlement was within the trial
court's discretion given the extremely acrimonious relationship between the parties, the
husband's repeated lack of cooperation in the
divorce proceedings, and his refusal to pay the
temporary alimony ordered by the court, all of
which indicated a likelihood that the wife
would have great difficulty in collecting periodic alimony payments. Beals v. Beals, 682
P.2d 862 (Utah 1984).
Trial court did not improperly consider the
income of the divorced husband's present wife,
where the fact that he would receive tax benefits by paying alimony to his former wife was
relevant to the issue of his ability to pay support and his present wife's income was needed
in order for the court to properly determine the
amount of the tax benefit that he would receive. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986).
The factors which must be considered by the
trial court in order to avoid a challenge to an
award of alimony as being an abuse of discretion are: (1) The financial condition and needs
of the spouse claiming support, (2) the ability
of that spouse to provide sufficient income for
him or herself, and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide the support. Eames
v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Defendant's installment payments to his former wife under a stipulation and agreement
intended to settle "all rights and obligations
... including property rights" was a property
settlement and not alimony, where the payments had been designated as "spousal support" simply to afford defendant a tax advantage. Bair v. Bair, 737 P.2d 177 (Utah 1987).
Three factors are important in fixing an alimony award: (1) The financial conditions and
needs of the wife; (2) the ability of the wife to
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produce sufficient income for herself; and (3)
the ability of the husband to provide support.
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah
1988).
An alimony award should, after a marriage
of long duration and to the extent possible,
equalize the parties' respective standards of
living and maintain them at a level as close as
possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Gardner v. Gardner, 748
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988).
The standard for determining alimony
awards is well settled. The trial judge is to consider three factors: First, the financial condition and needs of the party seeking alimony;
second, that party's ability to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and third, the
ability of the other party to provide support.
Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding wife alimony from husband's inheritance proceeds even though the court determined them to be husband's sole and separate
property, where the court's allocation of alimony was an attempt to keep wife from becoming a public charge and to realign the disparity
between the parties' standards of living.
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Order directing the husband to pay temporary alimony until loans were satisfied on a
mobile home and car awarded to the wife was
not an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 751
P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
A trial court, in setting alimony, must attempt to provide support for the receiving
spouse sufficient to maintain that spouse as
nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. In determining the
amount of the award necessary to accomplish
this aim, the court must make adequate findings and conclusions demonstrating that it has
considered three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the party seeking alimony;
(2) that party's ability to produce a sufficient
income; and (3) the ability of the other party to
provide support. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369
(Utah 1988).
-Amount.
Amount of alimony is measured by wife's
needs and requirements, considering her station in life, and upon husband's ability to pay.
Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d
277 (1936), modified, 91 Utah 564, 65 P.2d 642
(1937).
Nominal alimony award in the amount of
wife's medication costs of $70 per month was
within discretion of court where wife was also
awarded use and benefits of property and husband was ordered to pay for her health insurance policy. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491
(Utah 1975).

The purpose of alimony is to provide support
for the wife, not to reward her or to inflict a
penalty upon the husband; the length of the
marriage and the contributions of each party to
its financial success are not proper criteria for
determining the level of alimony to be set. English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).
Where marriage was of short duration and
divorced wife was employable, it was not an
abuse of discretion to award her alimony of
$200 per month for two years in view of the
fact that she had no job, no home, no health
insurance, and was suffering from various
health problems. Delatore v. Delatore, 680
P.2d 27 (Utah 1984).
Although an alimony award is far below the
total amount required to maintain the wife at
the standard of living she enjoyed during the
marriage, it may nevertheless be reasonable if
there are only limited family resources available to fulfill her needs. Olson v. Olson, 704
P.2d 564 (Utah 1985).
Trial court was not precluded from considering the length of the marriage in awarding alimony, where the parties were married when
the husband was 63 and the wife was 56, the
marriage lasted only 7 years, and the short
marriage resulted in a diminution of the wife's
assets and the husband's earning abilities.
Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Three factors must be considered by the trial
court in fixing a reasonable alimony award: (1)
the financial conditions and needs of the wife;
(2) the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient
income for herself; and (3) the ability of the
husband to provide support. Ruhsam v.
Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 98 Utah Adv.
Rep. 58 (Ct. App. 1988).
The trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of alimony by failing to
adequately consider the financial conditions
and needs of the spouse; the ability of the
spouse to produce sufficient income for herself;
and the ability of the paying spouse to provide
support. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
Alimony award of $800 per month to the
wife was proper, where she was unemployed
and had no income, and the husband was making a net yearly income of approximately
$28,000. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Automatically-decreasing monthly alimony
award of $800 was a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion, where the husband's net
annual income was $45,600 and the wife's was
zero, and there were inadequate findings regarding the wife's current and future ability to
produce an income that, together with alimony, would meet her monthly need of$1,250-
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$1,400. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1313
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Award of $1 per year alimony was a clear
abuse of discretion, where the marriage had
lasted 27 years and the husband's income was
approximately three times that of the wife.
Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Wife was entitled to an award of alimony on
a continuing basis in the sum of $750 per
month, instead of the $400 monthly sum
awarded by the trial court, where her monthly
gross income was $1,033 and the husband's
was $8,333. Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

-Modification.
This section authorizes the court to make
such change in the amount of alimony awarded
a wife as will be just to both parties, in view of
their changed condition. Read v. Read, 28 Utah
297, 78 P. 675 (1904).
Upon application of either party, court may
change, modify, or revise a decree respecting
maintenance, whenever it is satisfactorily
made to appear that the circumstances and
conditions of the parties, or any of them, have
changed so that amount originally allowed is
no longer just or equitable. Buzzo v. Buzzo, 45
Utah 625, 148 P. 362 (1915).
Every decree of divorce and alimony must be
deemed to have been entered subject to this
section. Therefore where a consent decree required husband to pay wife $40 per month as
alimony, such payment being made a lien on
real estate, with provision for a lump sum on
sale thereof, court could modify such decree by
reducing the alimony, even though husband
admitted in his pleadings that amount allowed
was reasonable. Buzzo v. Buzzo, 45 Utah 625,
148 P. 362 (1915).
To secure a change in a decree for alimony
the moving party must allege and prove
changed conditions arising since the entry of
the decree which require, under rules of equity
and justice, a change in the decree. Chaffee v.
Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, 225 P. 76 (1924);
Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P.
457 (1925); Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Utah
570, 47 P.2d 419 (1935).
When the husband's earnings had decreased
from $2,100 per year at time divorce was
granted to $1,500, and he had remarried and
had one child, such change of circumstances
warranted reduction of alimony from $60 per
month to $45 per month. Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P.2d 419 (1935).
Where the original decree fails to award the
wife any alimony, the court, in the absence of
fraud, deceit, mistake, or misrepresentation in
procuring the decree, is without authority to
modify the decree so as to award alimony.
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Hamilton v. Hamilton, 89 Utah 554, 58 P.2d 11
(1936).
Where husband petitioned for modification
of decree of alimony on ground of changed conditions, finding that there had been no substantial change in defendant's financial condition was erroneous, the price of wheat, upon
which his income depended, having fallen from
$1.10 per bushel, at time decree was entered,
to 26 cents. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah
553, 63 P.2d 277 (1936).
Installments of alimony become vested when
they become due, and the court has no power to
modify the decree as to them. Thereafter interest accrues at legal rate. Cole v. Cole, 101 Utah
355, 122 P.2d 201 (1942).
An order modifying alimony provisions in a
divorce decree by increasing alimony payable
to wife for her support will be reversed, where
petition does not sufficiently allege a change of
conditions on either her part or on part of defendant husband. Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah
275, 139 P.2d 222 (1943).
Where wife had remarried and was supported by her new husband, divorced husband
was held entitled to apply to court for modification of judgment awarding alimony. Anderson
v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132
(1946).
If, because of change in circumstances of parties, alimony decree is inequitable or it is impossible to comply therewith, divorced husband
may petition for modification. Osmus v.
Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P.2d 233 (1948).
Wife's petition for modification to require additional alimony brought 12 years after end of
husband's obligation under original decree was
denied as unreasonable under the facts of the
case. Cole v. Cole, 121 Utah 151, 239 P.2d 615
(1952).
Modification of divorce decree by substantially eliminating alimony was not justified
when based in part on evidence of facts occurring before original decree based on agreed settlement, and where findings were fragmentary
and generalized. Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103,
493 P.2d 620 (1972).
In view of uncertainty of wife's ability to find
employment, and uncertainty of language of
decree, provision calling for annual reduction
in amount of alimony would be eliminated.
MacLean v. MacLean, 523 P.2d 862 (Utah
1974).
It was within discretion of trial court to increase alimony payments from $1 per year to
$100 per month, even though original decree
awarded wife family home in lieu of alimony
payments, where defendant's appeal did not refute finding of substantial change of circumstances. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359
(Utah 1974).
Where ex-husband's income fell from
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mony awarded to her. Christiansen v.
$32,000 to $23,000 a year, reduction of alimony
Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592 (Utah 1983).
payments from $625 a month to $500 a month
In an action for modification of alimony paywas not an abuse of discretion, however provision for periodic reductions in alimony over a ments, the court must enter written findings of
fact and conclusions of law with regard to the
period of years so as to phase out all payments
was an abuse of discretion where not based on financial and property interests and circumstances of the parties. Montoya v. Montoya,
evidence presented at modification hearing.
696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1985).
Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 189 (Utah 1975).
An increase of alimony to the wife was warHusband, whose annual income at the time
of his divorce was about $21,000 and who was ranted where the husband's net income had
at that time ordered to pay $200 per month in more than doubled since the time of the decree,
alimony, failed to show a change in circum- but the wife's income had remained about the
stances justifying reduction of alimony obliga- same. Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707 (Utah
1985).
tion to $100 per month by presenting evidence
that his health had been impaired since the
-Remarriage.
time of the divorce, lowering his income to
There is implicit in divorce decree the provi$10,000 to $12,000 per year, and that he had
sion that alimony continues only so long as
incurred additional financial obligations upon wife remains unmarried. Austad v. Austad, 2
remarriage. Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284, 48 A.L.R. 2d 256
(Utah 1977).
(1954).
Husband's voluntarily incurred debts may be
Where a wife, to whom the husband was paygrounds for modifying an alimony decree if ing alimony, had remarried and the remarthey were incurred in a good fal.th effort to riage was annulled because she had no mental
meet alimony obligations or to maintain a de- capacity to enter into the second marriage, it
would be unjust to deprive her of the support of
cent standard of living; however, entering into
speculative financial dealings on a large scale her first husband and the first husband was
when not required to is not a good faith effort. not entitled to a modification of the divorce decree so as to stop paying alimony. Cecil v.
Auerbach v. Auerbach, 571 P.2d 1349 (Utah
Cecil, 11 Utah 2d 155, 356 P.2d 279 (1960).
1977).
Divorced wife's right to alimony from her
An increase in value of the residence
former husband was not terminated either by
awarded to the wife is not grounds for reducing
husband's alimony obligations. Auerbach v. entering into marriage that was void ab initio
or by conceiving and giving birth to a child.
Auerbach, 571 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1977).
The same change in circumstances used to Kent v. Kent, 28 Utah 2d 34, 497 P.2d 652
(1972).
modify the child support award, but not the
Whether or not a wife's right to alimony,
alimony award, in a prior proceeding cannot be
which terminated upon her remarriage, should
used as the only basis to modify the alimony
award in a subsequent proceeding. Adams v. be reinstated upon annulment of second marriage ought to be decided on a case-by-case baAdams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979).
Evidence was sufficient to establish a sub- sis according to the dictates of equity; no absolute rule was either necessary or desirable.
stantial change in circumstances so that the
trial court could consider whether to modify ex- Ferguson v. Ferguson, 564 P.2d 1380 (Utah
1977).
husband's alimony obligation where, since the
Wife's remarriage to another man after didivorce, the ex-wife had obtained employment,
vorce terminated former husband's duty to pay
experienced a substantial increase in income alimony and the annulment of the remarriage
and accumulated some savings while the ex- did not, as a matter oflaw, automatically entihusband had retired and presently receives in- tle wife to have alimony obligations of former
come in about the same amount as he received
first husband reinstated; showing that reinat the time of the divorce some seventeen years
statement was necessary in order to prevent or
ago. Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah
rectify serious inequity or injustice was re1982).
quired before wife was entitled to have former
In order to secure a change in alimony, the
alimony rights reinstated. Russell v. Russell,
party seeking the change must allege and
587 P.2d 133 (Utah 1978).
prove changed circumstances arising since the
Where wife was awarded alimony in divorce
entry of the original decree. Beckstead v. proceeding, the divorced husband and wife
Beckstead, 663 P.2d 47 (Utah 1983).
then remarried, and the remarriage was then
Divorced wife's increased income is one fac- annulled for duress and found to be void ab
tor to consider in determining whether to grant
initio, this section required husband to resume
or deny a decrease in alimony; an increase in alimony payments after the annulment where
divorced wife's income does not, as a matter of husband was made a party to the annulment
law, require a reduction in the amount of ali- action and his rights were determined; fact

448

DIVORCE
that wife did not request alimony in the annulment action did not preclude her from claiming
alimony under the divorce decree in an order to
show cause proceeding. Peterson v. Peterson,
645 P.2d 37 (Utah 1982).

-Residing with opposite sex.
Former husband's petition to terminate alimony on grounds that former wife had moved
into the house of another man was properly
denied where, although the former wife admitted to a sexual relationship with the man, the
move was the result of an emergency situation
of near destitution in which the former wife
had no income and her utilities had been cut
off, such situation being caused by former husband's failure to make his alimony payments,
the move into the man's house was temporary
and the former wife returned to her own residence when the emergency situation was over.
Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 (Utah
1980).
Statutory provision providing for termination of alimony when recipient of the alimony
is "residing" with a person of the opposite sex
does not appear to apply to a temporary stay at
another's home. Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619
P.2d 1387 (Utah 1980).
The person seeking to avoid his or her alimony obligation because his or her former
spouse is residing with a member of the opposite sex has the initial burden of proof to show
that the former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex; once this is established,
the alimony obligation is terminated unless
the former spouse receiving the alimony can
show that the relationship is without any sexual contact. Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P.2d 553
(Utah 1983).
-Source.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding the wife alimony from coal contract
proceeds, even though the court determined
them to be the husband's sole and separate
property, where the wife, during the marriage,
had used her inheritance and proceeds from
the sale of her home for support and maintenance, a portion of which was used for the husband's benefit. Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750
P.2d 615 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
-Termination.
The court's order that the wife's alimony terminate after two years was an abuse of discretion where the wife's primary occupation during the 20-odd year marriage was caring for
the parties' home and six children, and she had
poor employment prospects. Olson v. Olson,
704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985).
Order terminating wife's alimony upon completion of her schooling without requiring
proof that her financial circumstances had materially changed was an abuse of discretion and
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placed an unwarranted burden on the wife,
who was in her mid-50's, possessed few marketable job skills, and had little hope of retraining. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
While the trial court retains "continuing jurisdiction" to terminate an alimony award, under this section the court must base its decision
upon a substantial change in the parties' circumstances, and in order for the trial court to
terminate divorced wife's alimony award, there
must be an articulated basis for doing so, i.e.,
the court must be persuaded that she will be
able to support herself at a standard of living
to which she was accustomed during the parties' marriage, or that husband is no longer
able to pay. Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
-Waiver.
Where husband filed for bankruptcy within
nine months of the divorce, a stipulated agreement waiving alimony was no longer enforceable against the wife, and the trial court properly looked to the present condition and needs
of the parties in making an award of alimony.
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Appeal and review.
As to modifications or new orders in divorce
matters by trial courts, the Supreme Court has
power only to review their judgments, as in
other cases. Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P.
952 (1916).
An appellate court will not disturb an order
respecting division of property unless it appears from the findings that the division made
is not equitable under all the circumstances of
the case. Pinney v. Pinney, 66 Utah 612,245 P.
329 (1926).
Judgments and orders of trial courts in
awarding alimony or making distribution of
property will not be interfered with on appeal
unless it is made to appear that the discretion
vested in those courts has been abused to the
prejudice of appellant in some respect. Stewart
v. Stewart, 66 Utah 366, 242 P. 947 (1926).
An assignment of error that trial court erred
in its award of care, custody and control of a
minor child cannot be considered, if none of the
evidence is brought up for review. If court's
decree is supported by both findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw it will be affirmed. Knapp v.
Knapp, 73 Utah 268, 273 P. 512 (1928).
The kind of division or the amount of an allowance to be made is dependent upon the
facts, circumstances, and conditions of each
particular case, and, if upon a consideration of
them the division or allowance as made by the
court below is inequitable or unjust, the supreme court will interfere, even though court
below did not abuse its discretion, it being sufficient that court below erred in making the

449

DIVORCE
tempted. Beckmann v. Beckmann, 685 P.2d
1045 (Utah 1984).

Children.
Where district court had granted divorce and
awarded custody of children and support
money, juvenile court order, in a proceeding in
the interest of the children, did not supersede
district court judgment or deprive that court of
jurisdiction to enforce its decree as originally
made. Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 89,
416 P.2d 308 (1966).
The term "children" as used in this section is
not limited to minor children; thus the court
could properly order the father of retarded twin
girls to continue to pay child support, even
though the girls were then 20 years old. Dehm
v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976).
-Custody.
Under circumstances, it was error for trial
court to prohibit wife, awarded divorce and
custody of eight-year-old son, from taking son
outside of state without consent of husband.
Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 P. 84 (1898).
Notwithstanding that husband was entitled
to decree of divorce on his counterclaim, interest of children, the oldest of which was between
nine and ten years old and the youngest between two and three, was, because of their
youth, best subserved by awarding them to
custody of mother, at least temporarily. Holm
v. Holm, 44 Utah 242, 139 P. 937 (1914).
In suit by divorced father for custody of his
child, wherein it appeared that his wife had
remarried and subsequently died, and that
child lived with maternal grandmother and
mother's second husband, father was entitled
to custody of boy only as medium for his adoption by father's sister. Farmer v. Christensen,
55 Utah 1, 183 P. 328 (1919).
Order of court in action by former wife
against former husband for custody of child,
awarding temporary custody to wife pending
final determination of case was void where
made without notice to husband. Gitsch v.
Wight, 61 Utah 175, 211 P. 705 (1922).
Interlocutory decree granting husband divorce and awarding custody of infant child to
maternal grandparents with whom parties
lived during marriage, such custody being by
agreement of the parties and until further order of court, and plaintiff being required to pay
for support of child, plaintiff was entitled to
modification of order, and award of custody to
himself, where it appeared wife remarried before decree became final and did not want custody of child herself, and plaintiff contemplated establishing a home of his own, his
rights being superior to those of grandparents
where parties were all of good character. Alley
v. Alley, 67 Utah 316, 247 P. 301 (1926).
The moral surroundings into which the child
is or will be placed are a proper subject of in-
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quiry in determining its custody as between
the parents. Knapp v. Knapp, 73 Utah 268,273
P. 512 (1928).
If divorce is properly granted to wife, and no
good reason appears for denying father custody
of six-year-old daughter for a portion of the
year, the decree should provide for a period of
such custody and the means of conveying her
to the father if she is living a distance from
him. Holman v. Holman, 94 Utah 300, 77 P.2d
329 (1938).
Where orders of juvenile court with respect
to custody of children are set aside on appeal,
permanent custody thereof as between parents
should be decided by a district court, where
divorce had been instituted prior to proceedings in the juvenile court and custody had already been awarded "pending divorce case between the parents." In re State ex rel. Graham,
110 Utah 159, 170 P.2d 172 (1946).
The welfare of the child always has been and
always will be the chief concern of the courts,
and failure of the litigants in a divorce proceeding to specifically allege what is for the
best interest of the child or what is sought by
the child should not operate to prejudice the
rights of such child. Anderson v. Anderson, 110
Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132 (1946).
In a contested case where the husband is
awarded the divorce, children of tender age
will ordinarily be awarded to the custody of
their mother, with provision being made in the
decree for the father to support those children.
Hulse v. Hulse, 111 Utah 193, 176 P.2d 875
(1947).
This section, as it relates to custody of children, appears to be merely declarative of wellestablished principles of equity that in determining child custody cases welfare and best
interest of child is of paramount importance,
and is controlling. Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah
73, 202 P.2d 550 (1949).
Fact that a divorced wife lived for a while
with a man whom she expected to marry, although censurable, does not in itself make her
an unfit and improper person to have the custody of her child. Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah
632, 244 P.2d 650 (1952); Sparks v. Sparks, 29
Utah 2d 262, 508 P.2d 531 (1973).
Child custody cases are equitable in nature
and the court on appeal will review both the
law and the facts. Smith v. Smith, 1 Utah 2d
75, 262 P.2d 283 (1953).
The provision of this section requiring orders
in relation to the disposition of children "as
may be equitable" means that the welfare of
the children is paramount. Hyde v. Hyde, 22
Utah 2d 429, 454 P.2d 884 (1969).
In determining custody of young children in
a divorce proceeding, there is no statutory presumption in favor of the mother. Rice v. Rice,
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564 P.2d 305 (Utah 1977); Smith v. Smith, 564 rise to the presumption, namely: that no strong
mutual bond exists between the parent and the
P.2d 307 (Utah 1977).
child; that the parent has not demonstrated a
Presumption that a child of tender years
should be placed in custody of the mother is willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest
subordinate to the higher rule that custody and welfare for the child's; and that the parent
should be based upon the best interest and wel- lacks sympathy for and understanding of the
fare of the child. Bingham v. Bingham, 575 child that is characteristic of parents generally; if the parental presumption is rebutted,
P.2d 703 (Utah 1978).
While a parent's sexuality in and of itself is the parent and nonparent compete on equal
not alone a sufficient basis upon which to deny footing, and the custody award should be determined solely by reference to the best interests
completely a parent's right to custody of minor
of the child. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d
children, the manifestation of one's sexuality
38 (Utah 1982).
and the resulting behavior patterns are releTrial court in a divorce proceeding did not
vant to custody and to the nature and scope of
abuse its discretion in awarding custody of
visitation ·rights. Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d
four-year-old daughter to the father and a
641 (Utah 1980).
three-year-old daughter to the mother. Jensen
In making a custody determination, factors
v. Jensen, 660 P.2d 240 (Utah 1983).
trial court may consider in determining the
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
child's best interests include: the preference of
awarding temporary custody of a two-year-old
the child; keeping siblings together; the relative strength of the child's bond. with one or girl to her father and providing in the divorce
decree that upon the expiration date of the
both of the prospective custodians; the general
temporary custody award, the noncustodial
interest in continuing previously determined
mother could petition the court to examine the
custody arrangements where the child is happy
then existing circumstances and to then deterand well adjusted; prospective custodian's
mine the matter of permanent custody; assummoral character and emotional stability, duraing that both the father and mother remain fit
tion and depth of desire for custody, and ability
and proper to serve as the custodial parent, the
to provide personal rather than surrogate care;
significant impairment of prospective custo- noncustodial mother could obtain permanent
custody by showing that such an award would
dian's ability to function as a parent through
drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause; be in the best interest of the child, and she
would not be required to establish changed cirreasons for having relinquished custody in the
past; prospective custodian's religious compati- cumstances. Boals v. Boals, 664 P.2d 1191
bility with the child; kinship, including, in ex- (Utah 1983).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
traordinary circumstances, stepparent status;
and financial condition of prospective custo- awarding custody of children to the husband
dian. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 and in giving extremely limited visitation
rights to the mother, where a psychologist who
(Utah 1982).
The standard for determining custody ar- had interviewed all the members of the family
rangements is the best interests of the child, had testified that wife's psychotic and paranoid
state had a potentially negative effect on the
with a presumption being in favor of the natuchildren. Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110
ral parent in a custody dispute between a natural parent and a nonparent. Hutchison v. (Utah 1985).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982); Tuckey v.
awarding father custody of three-year-old son,
Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982).
where father had been the child's primary
The trial court must enter specific findings
on the factors relied upon in awarding custody caregiver for over a year and had provided a
of a child in a divorce case. Hutchison v. very stable environment, and the mother was
still in a period of reconstruction from her earHutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982).
lier emotional difficulties. Davis v. Davis, 749
A natural parent may be deprived of custody P.2d 647 (Utah 1988).
of a child on a less compelling showing than is
required for termination of all parental rights.
--Choice
of child.
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah
Mother would be given custody of 11-year1982).
old child, who had elected to live with mother,
Parental preference cannot be rebutted
where evidence did not support finding that
merely by demonstrating that the nonparent
mother was immoral or incompetent person to
possesses superior qualifications, has estabhave care, custody, and control of child, and
lished a deeper bond with the child, or is able father had stipulated that mother was fit perto provide more desirable circumstances, but
son. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 52 Utah 73, 172 P. 722
can be rebutted only by evidence establishing
(1918).
that a parent at a particular time generally
Former proviso dealing with privilege of
lacks all three of the characteristics that give children over ten years of age to select parent
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with which to live was a limitation on court's
power to award custody to a parent not of
child's choice where both parents were found
fit to have custody; failure to plead that tenyear-old child wanted to reside with parent petitioning therefor was not fatal, although it
would have been better to so have pleaded. Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d
132 (1946).
In cases involving custody of child over ten
years of age, court could inquire of child and
take into consideration child's desires regarding future custody. In re Olson, 111 Utah 365,
180 P.2d 210 (1947).
In a proceeding for modification of custody
provisions of a divorce decree it was not error
for court to confer privately with the children
and to permit a child under ten to express her
preference as to the parent with whom she
wanted to live. Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d
263, 323 P.2d 16 (1958).
A finding that the best interest of the child
requires it to be placed in custody of someone
other than parent chosen by child is not sufficient to justify court in placing child elsewhere
since child must be awarded to parent chosen
unless that parent is found to be an immoral or
unfit person. Smith v. Smith, 15 Utah 2d 36,
386 P.2d 900, 4 A.L.R.3d 1383 (1963) (decided
prior to 1969 amendment).

--Modification.
Where divorce was granted to mother of children of tender age, and at such time children
were placed in care, custody, and control of paternal grandmother, with mother's consent,
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modify decree and award children to
mother, notwithstanding § 30-3-10. Jaques v.
Jaques, 58 Utah 265, 198 P. 770 (1921).
The court has a wider and more liberal discretion in modifying an interlocutory decree as
respects the custody of children than it has
where application for modification is made after the decree becomes final. Alley v. Alley, 67
Utah 316, 247 P. 301 (1926).
In father's action to have the custody of his
son changed from divorced wife to himself,
where evidence tended to show that the mother
had been granted custody of the son in a 1958
divorce proceeding and that while in her custody the boy had trouble in school and in learning proper toilet habits, and that in 1964 the
father had taken the boy at the mother's request and that under the father's supervision
the boy had made considerable progress, the
father established a prima facie case for modification of the original custody decree, subject
to rebuttal by mother's evidence. Motzkus v.
Motzkus, 17 Utah 2d 154, 406 P.2d 31 (1965).
Decree would not be modified to grant husband same visitation rights with stepchildren
as with natural child where he had not ap-
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pealed from original decree and did not allege
any changed conditions or circumstances. Perkins v. Perkins, 522 P.2d 708 (Utah 1974).
Order to show cause why custody award
should not be modified gave court jurisdiction
over child and both parents for purpose of reviewing custody, and findings of court were adequately supported by testimony of maternal
grandmother that father would be better
guardian. Terrel v. Terrel, 527 P.2d 646 (Utah
1974).
Change of custody of 14-year-old boy from
the mother to the father was amply supported
by evidence that boy was an A student, mature
for his age, and had run away from home to be
with his father. Finnegan v. Finnegan, 535
P.2d 1159 (Utah 1975).
Evidence of acts occurring prior to child custody award in divorce decree was admissible at
subsequent child custody modification hearing
where party attempting to introduce such evidence had no knowledge of the acts prior to the
divorce decree, such evidence could not have
been discovered with reasonable diligence
prior to the divorce decree, and such evidence
was directly relevant to the issue of visitation
rights. Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah
1980).
Detention of child by parent beyond visitation period did not prohibit parent from receiving a hearing on his petition to modify custody
where the detention was for a brief period of
time for the purpose of seeking legal intervention to modify custody award, and there was a
good faith belief by parent that he had good
cause, which he substantiated by filing a petition for custody modification and receiving a
temporary restraining order to prevent the
child's removal from the state until the custodial issue could be determined. Nielsen v.
Nielsen, 620 P.2d 511 (Utah 1980).
In determining the best interest of the child
for purposes of awarding custody in a custody
modification proceeding, it is appropriate for
the trial court to consider the quality of the
child's present custody arrangement, the
length of the time the child has spent in the
present arrangement, and the insecurity and
emotional upheaval the child may suffer as a
result of any modification in custody; however,
a child's interest in the stability of his present
environment is only one of numerous factors
properly considered by the trial court in its decision to grant or deny a modification in custody for the child's best interest. Hogge v.
Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982).
Trial court's decision whether to modify the
provisions of a custody decree by transferring
custody of a minor child from one parent to
another parent involves a two-step bifurcated
procedure with the first step being a decision
whether there are changed circumstances war-
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changed to him from the mother, had remarranting the exercise of the court's continuing
ried a woman with three children and who was
jurisdiction to reconsider the custody award,
and, if so, a second step consisting of a de novo steadily employed as a school teacher, and they
had established a stable and happy family life;
consideration of all evidence bearing on the
question of the best interests of the child; in the mother had conceived a child out of wedthe first step, the court will receive evidence lock by another man; and four of the parties'
seven children had formed and expressed
only as to the nature and materiality of any
strong preferences regarding the parent with
changes in those circumstances upon which the
whom each wanted to reside. Williams v. Wilearlier award of custody was based and, in this
step, the party seeking modification must dem- liams, 655 P.2d 652 (Utah 1982).
An order modifying custody provision of a
onstrate that since the time of the previous dedivorce decree was required to be accompanied
cree there have been changes in circumstances
by written findings to support the order. Shioji
upon which the previous award was based and
v. Shioji, 671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983).
that those changes are sufficiently substantial
Modification of divorce transferring custody
and material to justify reopening the question
of infant child from mother to father, who were
of custody; if the trial court determines that
the party seeking modification has met his
Caucasians, due to mother's cohabitation with
and marriage to a Negro man violated the
burden of establishing a substantial and material change of circumstances justifying a recon- Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution; the reality of private biases and
sideration of the custody award, the trial court
the possible injury they might inflict are not
will proceed to the second step in which it must
consider the changes in circumstance along permissible considerations for removal of an
infant from the custody of its natural mother.
with all other evidence relevant to the welfare
or best interest of the child. Hogge v. Hogge, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 104 S. Ct.
649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982).
1879, 80 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1984).
Where mother's emotional problem was a
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in dematerial circumstance relied upon by trial
termining that custodial parent's move with
court in original awarding father custody, evi- child to another state did not constitute a madence that mother had overcome her emotional
terial change in circumstances justifying reproblem was a substantial and material
opening of child custody decree for purposes of
change in circumstances sufficient to justify
modification where noncustodial party, who
trial court's redetermination of custody. Hogge was seeking such modification, did not show
v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982).
that custodial circumstances of child or parentIn regards to the standard for modification of ing capabilities of custodial parent would be
custody, the trial court is not required to deteraffected by move; however, move did constitute
mine merely what is reasonable and necessary
a material change in circumstances in regard
for the welfare of the child; rather, it must de- to visitation rights to warrant modification of
cide what is reasonable and necessary for the
noncustodial parent's visitation rights. Becker
best interests of the child; a standard which v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984).
may frequently and of necessity require a
In order to establish a substantial and matechoice between good and better. Hogge v. rial change in circumstances sufficient to jusHogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982).
tify reopening of a child custody decree for purTrial court did not abuse its discretion in poses of modification, party seeking modificamodifying custody decree by changing custody tion must show, in addition to existenc<J and
to the father where, although court failed to extent of alleged changed circumstances, that
follow the recommendation of an evaluation
change is significant in relation to modificamade at the request of the court by a clinical
tion sought; alleged change must, therefore,
psychologist and a certified social worker that
have some material relationship to and subwas favorable to the mother, there was compe- stantial effect on parenting ability or functiontent evidence from which the trial court could ing of presently existing custodial relationship.
-have found that there had been a material
Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984).
change in circumstances since the original cusWhere the child custody award in the origitody award and that now the best interests of nal divorce decree is based on factors other
the child would be served by a change of cus- than the noncustodial parent's emotional state,
tody to the father. Martinez v. Martinez, 652 the fact that the noncustodial parent later beP.2d 934 (Utah 1982).
comes more emotionally stable is not a suffiThe changes in circumstances were suffi- cient change of circumstances to warrant modicient to reopen the question of custody in a fication of custody. Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P.2d
custody modification proceeding where, be- 1060 (Utah 1985).
tween the time of the original custody award
In determining whether to modify a divorce
and the filing of the modification petition, the
decree to transfer custody from one parent to
father, who was seeking to have custody the other, the trial court must decide whether
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there has been a change in the circumstances
on which the former custody award was based
that is sufficiently substantial and material to
justify reopening the custody question, and if
such a change in circumstances is found, the
court must determine de novo which custody
arrangement will serve the best interest of the
child. Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah
1985).
The court may, on petition of the father,
transfer custody from the mother to the father,
upon finding that the mother's extramarital
sexual relationship following the divorce had a
material and adverse effect on her parenting
ability. Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah
1985).
Although the mother, who had been awarded
custody of the children of her prior marriage,
had engaged in separate overnight relationships with various men in her home after her
separation from her husband, custody would
not be transferred to the father, since a custodial parent's extramarital relationships alone
are insufficient to justify a change in custody,
and since the interests of the children were
best served by maintaining their strong bond
with their mother. Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714
P.2d 1131 (Utah 1986).
The non-functioning of a joint custody arrangement is clearly a substantial change in
circumstances which justifies reopening the
custody issue. Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507
(Utah 1985).
The fact that the mother did not assume the
role of custodial parent following the divorce
constituted a material change of circumstances
which warranted reopening the question of
custody, and a change in custody from the
mother to the father was affirmed where the
father assumed the role of custodial parent and
provided the child with a permanent residence
and a stable home life. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1986).
When a trial court is asked to determine
whether there has been a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant reopening a custody decree, ordinarily it must focus exclusively on the parenting ability of the custodial
parent and the functioning of the established
custodial relationship. The noncustodial parent's change of circumstances is relevant only
to a determination of whether the best interests of the child warrant a shift in custody, an
issue reached only after a change of custodial
circumstances has been found and the custody
issue has been reopened. Kramer v. Kramer,
738 P.2d 624 (Utah 1987).
Trial court abused its discretion by relying
on child's placement in full-time day care to
change his custody placement where custodial
parent had no choice but to work full-time in
order to adequately support child and herself.
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Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
A change in the noncustodial parent's circumstances is relevant only as to whether it is
in the best interests of the child to transfer
custody, and this issue is reached only after a
change in the custodial parent's circumstances
has been adequately established to reopen the
custody issue. Thus, it was error for the trial
court to focus on noncustodial parent's re-marriage and the consequent circumstances of a
stepmother as a full-time homemaker in finding a change of circumstances. Fullmer v.
Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
--Jurisdiction.
Utah district court appropriately retained jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to make any determinations regarding custody, visitation or other
matters relevant to the children, where the
parents were divorced in Utah and, although
the mother had taken the children to Washington, that state specifically declined to exercise
jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present
involvement. Rawlings v. Weiner, 752 P.2d
1327 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
-Support.

Where decree of divorce was obtained by
mother of minor children against father who
was required to pay $20 per month for support,
care, maintenance, and education of minor son
for period often months in each year, liability
to pay maintenance for minor son was not dependent upon condition that latter attend
school continuously during ten-month period
mentioned in decree, where son did not willfully and without cause refuse to go to school,
but refrained from doing so because he had to
earn livelihood. Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 112,
202 P. 213 (1921).
Trial court properly refused to segregate or
apportion amount of support money between
two minor children where the pleadings were
not clear and the record disclosed there was no
occasion to consider the matter of apportionment of the allowance. Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah
376, 142 P.2d 198 (1943).
No court of this state has the right to make a
final order relieving a father, permanently, of
his obligation to support his child except under
the adoption statute. Riding v. Riding, 8 Utah
2d 136, 329 P.2d 878 (1958).
After entry of judgment for arrearage in support payments, district court had power, in order to conserve the prospects for continuing
support payments, to stay execution on the
judgment for arrearage for so long as defendant was making monthly payments against
the arrearage in addition to regular support
payments. Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d
436, 491 P.2d 231 (1971).
Where no issue of paternity was raised at

455

30-3-5

HUSBAND AND WIFE

original divorce hearing, and decree was not
appealed, defendant could not later be relieved
of support obligation by alleging he was not
child's father. Campos v. Campos, 523 P.2d
1235 (Utah 1974).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
holding that father, who had child support obligation, owed no child support to mother, who
had custody, for that period of time during
which the child moved in with and resided
with the father and was actually supported by
the father. Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853, overruled on other grounds, Bailey v. Sound Lab,
Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding child support to the age of 25, where
there was sufficient evidence that the child
was disabled. Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

--Age
to which support due.
In the context of child support, no valid distinction between male and female may be
drawn; and the application of the former provisions of§ 15-2-1, providing different periods of
minority for males and females, to determine
different periods of child support obligation
based on the child's sex violates the Equal Protection Clause. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,
95 S. Ct. 1373, 43 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1975); Stanton
v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501, 97 S. Ct. 717, 50 L.
Ed. 2d 723 (1977).
Males and females cannot be treated differently for child-support purposes consistently
with the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution. Stanton v. Stanton, 429
U.S. 501, 97 S. Ct. 717, 50 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1977).
For purposes only of this case, to determine
whether a father's obligation under a divorce
decree to pay support for his daughter ended
when she reached 18 or when she reached 21,
males as well as females are to be treated as
adults at 18 and the obligation to pay child
support ceases when the child reaches 18.
Stanton v. Stanton, 564 P.2d 303, rehearing
denied, 567 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977).
Child support obligations do not terminate
as a matter of law upon child reaching age of
18 as court has authority to order support payments until child reaches 21. Garrand v.
Garrand, 581 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1978).
Divorce decree requiring husband to pay
support for son until son reached age 21 was
not res judicata on issue of support after son
reached age 21 where such issue was not tried
or determined in the decree, and such decree
was subject to modification to continue support
for the son after he reached 21 years of age
where the son was retarded and incapable of
self-support. Garrand v. Garrand, 616 P.2d 422
(Utah 1980).
Trial court was justified in ordering divorced
father to continue child support beyond the

child's 21st birthday where due to the child's
epileptic condition she was incapacitated from
earning a living and without sufficient means
of self-support. Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374
(Utah 1980).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying father's motion to modify a divorce decree so that his obligation to provide child support would terminate on the 21st birthday of
each child where the father had voluntarily entered into a stipulation and property settlement agreement with his former wife, which
agreement was approved and incorporated in
the divorce decree by the trial court, whereby
the father, as part of the settlement agreement, had agreed to provide child support so
long as the children resided with the mother
and were full-time students. Despain v.
Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981).

--Amount.
Where there are two children, and wife, obtaining judgment, earns $55 a month, the defendant husband, earning $100 or more a
month, may be ordered to pay $50 a month for
support and maintenance of plaintiff and her
children. Crockett v. Salt Lake County, 72
Utah 337, 270 P. 142, 60 A.L.R. 867 (1928).
The criterion for determination of support
money is the need of the persons supported and
the defendant's ability to pay. Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132 (1946).
It is common knowledge that under presentday conditions allowance of $50 per month for
support of three minor children is mere pittance and, unless husband's earning capacity
is such that he cannot pay more, such allowance on granting husband divorce is unreasonable. Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189
P.2d 961 (1948).
Award of $300 per month per child was too
low, where the wife's monthly gross income
was $1,033 and the husband's was $8,333; the
award was increased to $600 per month per
child. Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
--Death
of father.
Claim of wife for money, required by decree
of divorce to be paid by husband for support of
child monthly during its minority, held enforceable, after death of husband, against his
estate. Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 P.
1010, 70 Am. St. R. 767 (1898).
Where trial court found that divorced father
had adequately provided for his minor son by
$20,000 life insurance policy with minor son as
beneficiary and that sum was not confined
solely for educational purposes, his estate was
not liable for continuation of support payments
when father died. Colombo v. Walker Bank &
Trust Co., 26 Utah 2d 350, 489 P.2d 998 (1971).
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--Failure
to pay.
Since modifications of the provisions of divorce decrees are always available, contingent
only upon a material change of circumstances,
a court cannot make further modifications contingent on a spouse's payment of past due child
support, but a court can restrict a spouse's visitation rights as a result of the spouse's failure
to support his child. Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382
(Utah 1985).
A trial court has no power to stay the statutory accrual of interest on a judgment for
unpaid child support. Stroud v. Stroud, 758
P.2d 905 (Utah 1988).
--Modification.
Allegations in petition for reduction of support money for children that wife had remarried, had children living with her and her husband, and that petitioner had no opportunity to
see children, did not state facts sufficient to
constitute cause of action. Rockwood v.
Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925).
Where defendant husband fails to show any
change of conditions as to his financial ability
or pecuniary legal responsibilities to justify a
modification of a decree awarding a monthly
sum for the support of minor children, denial of
his motion for modification will be affirmed.
Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P.2d 198
(1943).
Removal of the child from the jurisdiction is
not sufficient in the absence of further evidence as to the reasons for such removal to
sustain an order modifying the custodian's
right to support payments. Earl v. Earl, 17
Utah 2d 156, 406 P.2d 302 (1965).
Where husband in divorce action had left a
lucrative job to start his own business and had
sustained a loss of income as a consequence,
but testified at the hearing that he expected
his income to improve again, it was not error
for the trial court to provide in its decree that
the levels of child support and maintenance
which he would be obligated to pay would increase as his income did, instead of leaving the
question of adjustments in amount for future
resolution, after a hearing at which the court
could consider changes in the parties' circumstances. Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d
1256 (Utah 1977).
Parent may not intentionally escape child
support obligations by channeling income into
losing business ventures; where the needs of
the children have substantially increased, divorce court does not abuse its discretion by
placing the financial satisfaction of those needs
ahead of the speculative business practices of
the supporting parent. Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980).
While present spouse of a divorced party
should not be constrained to lend financial support to his or her spouse's children by a prior
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marriage, the court may consider the income of
the present spouse in determining the ability
to pay of one who has the legal obligation of
child support. Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374
(Utah 1980).
In determining whether to modify father's
child support obligation imposed by a divorce
decree, trial court properly considered the
earnings of the mother who had custody of the
children as well as the father's obligation to
support his new family, including a stepchild,
acquired by remarriage after the divorce.
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 639 P.2d 177 (Utah
1981).
Increase in father's monthly income from
$800 to $2,148 and an increase in mother's
monthly income to $1,875, along with an increase in the needs of the child, constituted a
material change of circumstances justifying an
increase in the father's child support obligation
from $150 to $225 per month. Reick v. Reick,
652 P.2d 916 (Utah 1982).
Fact that ex-wife concealed her remarriage
to another man while continuing to receive
monthly alimony payments from her ex-husband did not deprive her of standing to seek an
increase in her ex-husband's child support obligations; deception between spouses has no significance in determining the basic and
unalienable right to child support, since such
right is vested in the minor. Reick v. Reick,
652 P.2d 916 (Utah 1982).
An increase in father's ability to pay and the
mother's increased expenses in caring for the
children were appropriate factors to consider in
determining changed circumstances to warrant an increase of the father's child support
obligations. Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667
P.2d 592 (Utah 1983).
In considering a petition by the divorced
mother for an increase in child support to be
paid by the divorced father, the trial court
properly considered the income of the father's
personal corporation, as well as his salary from
the corporation, in determining the father's
ability to pay. Christiansen v. Christiansen,
667 P.2d 592 (Utah 1983).
Party seeking an increase in child support
payments has the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances since the
original decree establishing the support obligation to warrant the increase. Lord v. Shaw, 682
P.2d 853, overruled on other grounds, Bailey v.
Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984).
An increase in child support was warranted
where the child had become a teenager, and
the relative cost of supporting the child had
consequently increased. Naylor v. Naylor, 700
P.2d 707 (Utah 1985).
In a proceeding seeking to modify the child
support provisions of a divorce decree, the fact
that a wife is not required to pay support nei-
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ther terminates the childrens' right, nor obviates the mother's responsibility, for such support as may be determined at some future
time. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393
(Utah 1985).
When making a support award or a modification of a support award, the trial court should
set forth specifically and in detail its findings
regarding the modification, including the specific dollar amount of child support awards.
Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985).
Only prospective modification of a support
obligation is proper. Karren v. State Dep't of
Social Servs., 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986).
A change in support obligation must be
made through a court rather than an administrative proceeding. Karren v. State Dep't of Social Servs., 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986).
A judgment for child support arrearages is a
judgment under§ 15-1-4, which governs interest on judgments. The custodial spouse is entitled to the statutory rate of interest on the
judgment until payment in full. Although the
trial court may, in its discretion under this section, raise the statutory interest if equity so
requires, the court does not have the discretion
to lower, stay, or waive interest. Stroud v.
Stroud, 738 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The trial court can modify a divorce decree
which incorporates the parties' stipulation as
to custody, support, alimony and property
rights by increasing the support for a child
over the age of 18. Balls v. Hackley, 745 P.2d
836 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Department of social services, in seeking reimbursement for money advanced for child
support, cannot administratively determine a
parent's support obligation where a decree of
divorce articulates that her former spouse
must pay child support to her but is silent as to
her obligation to pay support. The department
must apply to the courts for a modification of
the prior support order. Starks v. State, Dep't
of Social Servs., 750 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

--Waiver
by mother.
While the wife may waive alimony when she
remarried, she could not waive the right of her
children who remained with her to be supported by their father as required by the decree. Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172
P.2d 132 (1946).
Future child support cannot be the subject of
bargain and sale between the former husband
and wife. The state is an interested party in
such matters since a child's welfare is at stake,
and any modification of a child support award
must be approved by the court. Hence, a release from the wife of all child support money
was of no effect. Price v. Price, 4 Utah 2d 153,
289 P.2d 1044 (1955).
Mother who remarried and executed agree-

ment allowing children's father to terminate
support was not estopped from later collecting
such support. Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141
(Utah 1974).

Contempt proceedings.
Party may not be committed for contempt in
failing to make payments required by divorce
decree in absence of findings that decree was
violated, and that defendant was able to pay,
or intentionally deprived himself of means of
compliance with decree. Hillyard v. District
Court, 28 Utah 220, 249 P. 806 (1926).
Where, in order of commitment for contempt
consisting of failing to pay alimony payments
in arrears, there were no findings of fact that
petitioner had property, means, or ability to
comply with court decree or that he willfully
refused to pay back installments or intentionally deprived himself of ability to comply with
the decree, order was void, and petitioner was
entitled to writ of habeas corpus discharging
him from custody. Ex parte Gerber, 83 Utah
441, 29 P.2d 932 (1934).
Order finding husband in divorce action in
contempt for failure to comply with decree settling property rights of parties was void where
there were no findings with reference to husband's ability to comply with decree. Parish v.
McConkie, 84 Utah 396, 35 P.2d 1001 (1934).
In contempt proceeding burden is upon defendant to show amount of alimony paid, and
he must assume risk of any failure by reason of
indefiniteness. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 86
Utah 229, 42 P.2d 191 (1935).
Defendant husband cannot complain of order
finding him guilty of contempt for failure to
pay support money as provided in divorce decree, where "order relating to it was conditionally set aside by giving defendant further opportunity to comply with the decree of the
court." Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P.2d
198 (1943).
Contempt proceedings will lie to enforce arrearages of alimony long overdue and unpaid.
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144
P.2d 528 (1943).
Where husband makes application for modification of provisions of decree as to alimony
and support money, and it appears at the hearing that he is in default in his payments under
said decree, the court may require him to pay a
sum equal to the installments which had been
unpaid, in lieu of holding him guilty of contempt. Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300,
172 P.2d 132 (1946).
Judgment finding divorced husband in contempt for failure to comply with divorce decree
requiring payment of $75 per month for alimony and support of minor children was upheld as supported by evidence that husband
was able to comply with that decree and that
his failure to do so was willful, even though
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husband testified that he had been sick and out
of employment and that, since starting work
again, he had paid divorced wife $50 a month
out of monthly salary of $180, from which he
also was paying off debts and supporting second wife and child. Limb v. Limb, 113 Utah
385, 195 P.2d 263 (1948).
If, because of change in circumstances of parties, alimony decree is inequitable or it is impossible to comply therewith, divorced husband
may petition for modification, but, so long as
decree stands, he must comply with it or make
every reasonable effort to do so, regardless of
how financial situation of former wife may
have improved, and failure to do so is contempt
and punishable as such. Osmus v. Osmus, 114
Utah 216, 198 P.2d 233 (1948).
In an action by divorced wife for past-due
support money the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to find husband in contempt of court. McKay v. McKay, 13 Utah 2d
187, 370 P.2d 358 (1962).
Where husband, who paid $60 per month for
child support and, in addition, spent $10 per
month on children, who allowed wife to claim
children as dependents on her income tax return, and who carried medical insurance covering medical expenses of children, was found in
contempt for failure to comply with provisions
of divorce decree requiring him to pay $100 per
month for support, imposition of 30-day jail
sentence was excessive. Harris v. Harris, 14
Utah 2d 96, 377 P.2d 1007 (1963).

Continuing jurisdiction.
Court retains jurisdiction of the parties to
modify the decree with respect to distribution
of the property; especially should this be true
where the parties voluntarily litigate a matter
over which the court has jurisdiction. Bott v.
Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 (1968).
District court's continuing jurisdiction in divorce case does not give court authority to alter
property rights already vested in other parties,
such as income already received and deposited
in a trust account which has the divorced parties' children as beneficiaries. Sundquist v.
Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981).
Costs.
Where divorced wife contested petition of her
divorced husband for modification of award of
support money and custody of children, the
question of the ability or inability of the wife to
pay costs in defending the action was a factual
matter, and the trial court had discretion, on
examination of the facts, to determine if the
circumstances did or did not demand an award
of costs against one or the other of the parties.
Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36,368 P.2d
264 (1962).
Court's powers and jurisdiction.
Where, in divorce proceeding, it appears that

30-3-5

plaintiff husband has resided in state for full
statutory period, and that nonresident defendant wife has been served with summons, appeared in case, and surrendered herself to jurisdiction of court in which litigation originated, such court has jurisdiction over parties
and right to pass on and dispose of issues
raised between them, on merits, in accordance
with rules of equity, even if, in order to do so, it
is necessary to grant divorce to wife on facts
stated in cross-complaint; having jurisdiction
of case and parties, court may proceed to make
such order in relation to children and property
as shall be equitable and just. Fisk v. Fisk, 24
Utah 333, 67 P. 1064 (1902).
The legislature in adopting this section intended to, and did, enlarge the common-law
powers of our courts of original jurisdiction in
divorce proceedings. Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah
456, 154 P. 952 (1916).
The matter of disposing of the property and
providing for the support of divorced persons
and their children rests in the sound legal discretion of the trial court, reviewable only for
abuse of discretion. Bullen v. Bullen, 71 Utah
63, 262 P. 292 (1928).
Trial judge has wide discretion in divorce
proceeding concerning the property division,
alimony award, and custody provisions; his
judgment on such matters will not be disturbed
on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85 (Utah
1982).

Foreign decrees.
Although action on judgment or decree for
alimony or maintenance rendered by court of
competent jurisdiction of one state may be
maintained in another court of competent jurisdiction of another state, where amount due
or payable is fixed, having definite sum presently due and enforceable in state where rendered, alimony or maintenance becoming ,due
in future, payable in installments, is not final
judgment upon which action can be brought in
another state unless court fixes specific
amount due and payable, in some proper proceeding in original action, or by independent
action. Hunt v. Monroe, 32 Utah 428, 91 P.
269, 11 L.R.A. (n.s.) 249 (1907).
Obligation of father to pay alimony for support of wife and children under terms of divorce decree follows father wherever he may
go, and past-due installments of alimony may
be enforced in another state. Roundy v.
Roundy, 59 Utah 166, 202 P. 211 (1921).
In an action for back alimony and support
money awarded in a California decree, there
being no proof to the contrary, it was presumed
that California law was similar to the law here
and those debts were enforceable here under
the full faith and credit clause of the federal
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Constitution. Westerfield v. Coop, 6 Utah 2d
262, 311 P.2d 787 (1957).
This section is not applicable in determining
who shall have custody of a child where a proceeding is brought in Utah to enforce an award
of custody made by the court of a foreign state,
and in the absence of a showing of a change in
circumstances, the decree of the foreign state
must be accorded full faith and credit. Tolman
v. Wassom, 16 Utah 2d 258, 399 P.2d 147
(1965).
Utah court had jurisdiction to hear and determine an action seeking a change in a child
custody order established by an Arizona divorce decree where proper in personam and
subject matter jurisdiction over the children,
plaintiff, and defendant was acquired from
their presence in Utah; and such an exercise of
jurisdiction would not deny full faith and credit
to the Arizona decree, since under Arizona law
the decree could be modified upon a showing of
changed circumstances, and with Utah also requiring such a showing to modify a custody
decree, Utah would be giving the decree the
same credit as it would be given in Arizona.
McLane v. McLane, 570 P.2d 692 (Utah 1977).

Foreign laws.
In absence of showing to contrary, it is presumed that the law of another state is to the
same effect as this section, and that in a suit
for divorce in another state the court had before it the question of the division of the property of the parties. Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah 60,
291 P. 298 (1930).
Injunctions.
In suit by wife for separate maintenance,
held, where alimony is allowable, equity will,
in order to ensure its payment, enjoin husband
from alienating or from encumbering his property without leave of court. Anderson v. Anderson, 54 Utah 309, 181 P. 168 (1919).
Motion for injunction to restrain dissipation
of marital assets during the pendency of the
appeal of the divorce action should be filed
with the district court; any jurisdiction supreme court may have in such matters should
be invoked only after a party has sought relief
in the district court, in all but the most exceptional circumstances. Warren v. Warren, 642
P.2d 385 (Utah 1982).
Death during pendency of divorce.
Where the death of one or both parties occurs
during the pendency of the divorce action, the
action itself abates and the parties' status, including their property rights, reverts to what it
had been before the action was filed. Nelson v.
Davis, 592 P.2d 594 (Utah 1979).
Declaratory judgment.
Declaratory judgment purporting to interpret or modify decree of divorce was nullity
since divorce is not proper subject for declara-

tory judgment. Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d
332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968).

Disqualification of judge.
In proceedings by a divorced husband to vacate award of custody of children to divorced
wife and to terminate support money where
the wife's counsel filed affidavit of bias and
prejudice against the judge under Rule 63(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the judge
on his own motion denied the removal of the
cause to another judge, evidence thereafter
taken by him was ineffective against the affiant. Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368
P.2d 264 (1962).
Interest on installment payments.
The right to installment payments under a
divorce decree vests upon the due date and i!lterest is to be allowed until payment is made.
Larsen v. Larsen, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340 P.2d 421
(1959); McKay v. McKay, 13 Utah 2d 187, 370
P.2d 358 (1962).
Laches and estoppel.
Where husband filed no answer nor any traverse to application for writ of execution for
alimony under divorce decree, and entered no
plea of estoppel or of laches, court cannot invoke such defenses on defendant's behalf on
assumption that lapse of time alone was sufficient to support such finding. Mere inaction or
delay short of the period of limitations, in the
enforcement of payment of an obligation already accrued, without more, is insufficient basis upon which to predicate laches. Openshaw
v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528
(1943).
Where mother induced father not to pay support, he changed position based on her representations, and allowing her to enforce pastdue installments would cause him great hardship, she may be thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of such back installments.
Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P.2d 596
(1956).
In an action by divorced wife for past-due
support money, fact that she had brought three
proceedings in attempts to collect accrued payments which had netted her $185, the last proceeding ending in a jail sentence for the husband, and that she did not again try to collect
such payments for three years did not warrant
the court in finding of laches, and the court
erred in refusing to grant judgment for amount
due. McKay v. McKay, 13 Utah 2d 187, 370
P.2d 358 (1962).
Wife was not estopped to assert her claim for
accrued and unpaid alimony merely because
she had been silent and did not claim it for a
period of five and one-half years where she had
no duty to speak, had not misled husband in
any way, and husband had not changed his position to his detriment in reliance on any rep-

460

DIVORCE
resentations or actions by the wife. Adams v.
Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979).
Lien of decree.
Decree ordering payment of alimony, if for
gross sum, constitutes judgment lien on
debtor's real property notwithstanding decree
itself may not so provide, but if alimony is payable in installments for indefinite period and
no gross amount is fixed, judgment lien secures
only sums past due and payable. Beesley v.
Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 P. 458 (1925). See
also Buzzo v. Buzzo, 45 Utah 625, 148 P. 362
(1915).
Decree ordering payment of alimony under
this section may declare and impress lien on
real property of debtor to secure payment or
otherwise require him to furnish security.
Beesley v. Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 P. 458
(1925).

Life insurance.
In making an order giving husband the right
to acquire certain property, the court should
not require him to obtain a life insurance policy for the purpose of securing an indebtedness
to the wife, without taking evidence as to the
husband's insurability and related circumstances, and without determining whether
impressing the property with a lien in favor of
the wife would not adequately secure the indebtedness. Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240
P.2d 1211 (1952).
Husband's attempt, upon remarriage, to
make second wife beneficiary of his life insurance policy was void where divorce decree had
ordered husband to maintain policy with first
wife as beneficiary and "minor children" as
contingent beneficiaries in event first wife remarried or died; after first wife's remarriage
and husband's subsequent death, his children
were entitled to proceeds of policy as against
his second wife even though they were no longer minors, the designation "minor children"
being merely descriptive and not intended to
make them contingent beneficiaries only during their minority. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis,
531 P.2d 484 (Utah 1975).
Where husband was ordered to pay premiums on $5,000 life insurance policy as part
of divorce decree and by time of his death he
had remarried and increased his life insurance
to $20,500, and children of first marriage were
married or self-supporting, first wife was
awarded $5,000 and second wife (named beneficiary) received balance of proceeds of insurance policy. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 535 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1975).
The rights of a former spouse as the designated beneficiary in an ordinary life insurance
policy awarded to the other spouse in the property settlement are not affected by the divorce
unless there is explicit language in the divorce
decree to divest the former spouse of her rights
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as beneficiary; where former husband was
awarded life insurance policy in property settlement and had not changed his former wife
as the designated beneficiary in the policy at
the time of his death, and the divorce decree
contained no explicit language to divest the
former wife of her right as the designated beneficiary, the former wife was entitled to the
proceeds of the policy. Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Co., 631 P.2d 906 (Utah 1981).

Modification of decree generally.
A verified petition or affidavit, or some
pleading, setting forth the new matter, or facts
constituting the changed conditions or circumstances of the parties is required for modification of decree. Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154
P. 952 (1916).
Modifications or new orders must be based
upon allegations of changed conditions and evidence in support thereof. Cody v. Cody, 47
Utah 456, 154 P. 952 (1916).
This section was designed to empower a
court that had granted a decree of divorce and
awarded alimony, or had made distribution of
property and disposal of children, to increase or
decrease alimony under the changed conditions
alleged by either party, or to change the distribution of the property or the disposal of the
children so as to reflect justice between the
parties. It was not intended by this section to
empower the courts at any time to review their
own former decrees or orders respecting the allowance of alimony upon the facts existing at
the time they were made. Cody v. Cody, 47
Utah 456, 154 P. 952 (1916).
Petition alleging that divorce was granted
without wife insisting on alimony because husband for long time prior thereto had been addicted to use of liquor to extent that he could
not and would not work sufficiently to provide
plaintiff and her child with necessities of life,
but that since that time husband had improved
his habits to such an extent that he was able to
contribute to support and maintenance of
child, held sufficient to warrant modification of
decree. Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P.
1093, 15 A.L.R. 620 (1920).
In proceeding by wife to modify divorce decree, service of notice of motion to modify decree on husband's former attorneys in original
divorce proceedings was insufficient to give
court jurisdiction where attorneys had been
paid and discharged at time decree had been
entered several years before. Sandall v.
Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093, 15 A.L.R.
620 (1920).
Petitions for modification of alimony and
child support provisions of divorce decree alleging that husband had kidney trouble, that his
earning capacity would become depreciated,
and other matters which occurred prior to the
divorce proceedings, did not contain facts
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showing change of condition or circumstances
entitling husband to modification of decree.
Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, 225 P. 76
(1924).
Husband's allegations that, since entry of decree, his health had been seriously impaired
and that he was suffering from toxic goiter
which required surgical treatment and hospitalization which had not been secured because
of lack of funds showed such change of condition as to entitle husband to modification if
such facts were established. Carson v. Carson,
87 Utah 1, 47 P.2d 894 (1935).
This section relaxes in divorce proceedings
the rules of law calculated to maintain the
sanctity and stability of judgments. Hamilton
v. Hamilton, 89 Utah 554, 58 P.2d 11 (1936).
In absence of changed conditions or circumstances, a modification of a divorce decree may
not be had. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 89 Utah
554, 58 P.2d 11 (1936).
Court could not amend divorce decree by incorporating part of property settlement agreement into it where only judgment prayed for in
divorce action was dissolution of the bonds of
matrimony and only changed circumstance
was husband's failure to keep up monthly payments under agreement. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 89 Utah 554, 58 P.2d 11 (1936).
The right of the trial court to modify an alimony or support money award does not extend
to installments which have already accrued
and which are past due, because the right to
collect such installments becomes vested upon
their due date. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 102
Utah 22, 126 P.2d 1068 (1942); Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943).
To secure modification of support money or
alimony award in decree of divorce, the moving
party must allege and prove changed conditions arising since the entry of the decree requiring, under rules of equity and justice, a
change in the decree. Gardner v. Gardner, 111
Utah 286, 177 P.2d 743 (1947).
To entitle either party to modification of decree of alimony or support money, that party
must plead and prove change in circumstances
such as to require, in fairness and equity,
change in terms of decree. Osmus v. Osmus,
114 Utah 216, 198 P.2d 233 (1948).
A divorce decree may not be modified unless
it is alleged, proved, and the trial court finds
that the circumstances upon which it was
based have undergone a substantial change.
Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P.2d 986
(1953).
There was a sufficient change in conditions
so as to support a modification of a decree allowing support and alimony, where it was
shown that the divorced husband was making
house payments when the decree was rendered
and that he continued to make them although

the decree was silent as to who should pay
them, but after about a year he refused to
make such payments. If the payments are not
made the divorced wife would lose the use of
the home and the cost of the support of herself
and children would be substantially increased.
Regardless of the divorced husband's contention that he was not obligated to make those
payments, he was making them when the decree was made and his refusal to continue
caused her to need more money from him for
her and the children's support. Carlton v. Carlton, 4 Utah 2d 332, 294 P.2d 316 (1956).
Absent an appeal, an original decree of divorce is not subject to modification except
where changed conditions are demonstrated.
Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d
264 (1962).
Where children of divorced couple reached
majority, relieving the father of his duty to pay
support, the father was not necessarily entitled
to a reduction in the monthly alimony payment
requirements; but such facts provided a reasonable basis upon which the trial court could
reassert father's old obligation to make mortgage payments on the family home, even
though the wife had not requested this relief.
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 17 Utah 2d 159, 406
P.2d 304 (1965).
Where evidence tended to show that defendant's income was far greater than amount determined at first trial, there was sufficient
showing of change of circumstances to support
court's modification of prior decree. Harrison v.
Harrison, 22 Utah 2d 180, 450 P.2d 456 (1969).
Where wife at time of divorce proceeding was
unable to work because of ill health but was
subsequently able to work, finding that there
had been no substantial change of circumstances to warrant modification of original alimony award was without support. King v.
King, 25 Utah 2d 163, 478 P.2d 492 (1970).
In petition for modification of support order,
court may not review other issues which were
resolved by the original decree, where the time
for appeal from the decree has long since expired. Campos v. Campos, 523 P.2d 1235 (Utah
1974).
The modification of divorce decrees is a matter of equity, and it is the duty and prerogative
of the supreme court to review both the facts
and the law; however, supreme court will accord considerable deference to the judgment of
the trial court and will not disturb the trial
court's action unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or there has been
an abuse of discretion or a misapplication of
principles of law. Christensen v. Christensen,
628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981).
Where the modification of a divorce decree is
granted, the trial court should make findings
to indicate the reasons why modification was
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found to be appropriate. Christensen v.
Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981).
In the absence of factual finding of a substantial change in circumstances, trial court
erred in modifying divorce decree based on
stipulated settlement agreement. Lea v.
Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213 (Utah 1983).

Property division.
General rule is that wife, awarded divorce, is
entitled to one-third of either property or income of husband, but such proportionate allowance should be varied according to peculiar
facts and circumstances of particular case.
Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 P. 84 (1898).
Allowance of $4,500 as permanent alimony
held not inadequate though husband was
worth approximately $40,000, where it appeared that husband's property consisted principally of farming lands and improvements
thereon, and was not very productive. Blair v.
Blair, 40 Utah 306, 121 P. 19, 38 L.R.A. (n.s.)
269, 1914D Ann. Cas. 989 (1912).
Application by wife for arrears in alimony
arising from husband's false representation
with respect to his property in original divorce
action was properly made in original action, as
against contention that she should have commenced independent action. Christensen v.
Christensen, 65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925).
Where wife in divorce action agreed to accept
business in lieu of alimony, and husband misrepresented amount of indebtedness business
had, court, on application of wife, properly
awarded her difference between amount of indebtedness stated by husband and amount
which was actually owing, since such action
was merely an enforcement of terms of original
decree, and not a modification thereof, and
finding of material change in circumstances
was not necessary, since additional alimony
was not awarded. Christensen v. Christensen,
65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925).
The division of property is a matter that
rests largely within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Pinney v. Pinney, 66 Utah 612,245
P. 329 (1926).
Where wife contributed furniture and paid
substantially all household expenses during
ten years of marriage, and husband paid for
home in monthly installments, title being
vested in them as tenants in common, decree
granting husband divorce for grievous assault
by wife and awarding him home, and wife
household furniture plus $250 cash, was abuse
of discretion. Offense of wife was not such as
would warrant depriving her of property
rights, and she was entitled to equal share in
home, less the cash award. Stewart v. Stewart,
66 Utah 366, 242 P. 947 (1926).
Where wife obtained divorce on ground of
cruelty and was awarded home and all household goods and furniture subject to husband's
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$1,265 lien on realty and where payments for
support of herself and child were barely sufficient and she had no other income, portion of
decree requiring her to pay husband $1,265
within three years regardless of whether she
could sell realty was set aside as inequitable.
Pinney v. Pinney, 66 Utah 612, 245 P. 329
(1926).
Court had power to quiet title to property
awarded to husband and wife in divorce decree
settling property rights between them since in
so doing it merely did what was incidental and
proper to the awarding and division of property. Hyrup v. Hyrup, 70 Utah 274, 259 P. 925
(1927).
The general rule allowing one-third of the
husband's property and one-third of his income
as alimony is not a hard and fast one, but the
equities and the particular circumstances of
each case will govern to a large extent. Bullen
v. Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P. 292 (1928).
In order that the court may make an equitable division of the property of the parties under
this section, or in other words, allow the wife
permanent alimony, both parties must fully
disclose to the court what their condition was
as to property. It might even transpire that the
wife should be required to return some property to the husband. Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah
60, 291 P. 298 (1930).
The settlement of property rights between
the parties is an incident to every decree of
divorce where there is any property. Smith v.
Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291 P. 298 (1930).
Supreme court may exercise its own judgment in regard to division of property irrespective of lower court's findings. One half of property accumulated by their joint efforts may be
allowed wife. Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah
157, 292 P. 214 (1930).
The rights and equities of both parties are to
be considered in making a division of the property under the authority of this section although whatever doubt there may be concerning the matter ought to be resolved against the
guilty party whose fault and wrongs and
breaches of the marital relation destroyed the
home and brought about or forced the separation. Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292
P. 214 (1930).
Where decree in divorce proceeding provided
that husband should turn over stock of certain
value to wife, or insurance of same cash value,
or cash, and husband testified that he could not
secure stock and refused to turn over insurance
policies, husband exercised his right of option,
and hence was bound by that part of decree
with reference to payment of cash which was
final judgment, collectible as any other judgment. Parish v. McConkie, 84 Utah 396, 35
P.2d 1001 (1934).
In making property settlement a court
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should consider: (1) the amount and kind of
property owned by each of the parties; (2)
whether the property was his before coverture
or accumulated jointly; (3) the ability and opportunity of each to earn money; (4) the financial condition and necessities of each party; (5)
the health of the parties; (6) the standard of
living of the parties; (7) the duration of the
marriage; (8) what the wife gave up by the
marriage; and (9) what age they were when
married. Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67
P.2d 265 (1937); Foreman v. Foreman, 111
Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144 (1946).
Under this section, a complaint in partition
seeking relief because of an attempted but incomplete adjudication of property rights in a
divorce action was held to state a cause of action. Larsen v. Daynes, 102 Utah 312, 133 P.2d
785 (1943).
Where marriage lasted only five days and
the wife contributed nothing to any of the property in which she now seeks a share, and nothing was lost by her on account of the marriage,
the supreme court cannot say that it was an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse
a property settlement or alimony. Anderson v.
Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 (1943).
Property settlement decreed by court
whereby wife was, in addition to custody of
children, awarded equity in real estate, onehalf the proceeds of insurance policy, and husband was permitted to retain partial interest
in certain land was not unjust. Johnson v.
Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 152 P.2d 426 (1944).
Where the marriage has been entered into in
good faith by both parties or where, as here,
both parties knew of the interlocutory decree of
divorce which had not yet become final, the
court in the exercise of its equitable power has
jurisdiction to require an equitable distribution of the property acquired during the time
the litigants were cohabiting as man and wife.
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d
262 (1944).
As to equitable division of home held by parties in joint tenancy on granting husband divorce, where husband had paid original purchase price but some of wife's funds were used
for remodeling and she had done considerable
work in making improvements, wife should be
awarded one-half market value of such real estate in excess of original purchase price, and
husband should be permitted either to pay wife
one-half of such enhanced value and retain
property, or property should be sold under
court order and, after reimbursing husband for
amount of original purchase price and deducting costs of sale, balance should be divided
equally. Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 112 Utah
31, 184 P.2d 670 (1947).
In determining generally what proportion of
property wife is entitled to when divorce decree

is granted to husband, supreme court has considered one-third as being fair proportion, but
that is relative amount which must, of necessity, vary with facts of particular case. Woolley
v. Woolley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743 (1948).
Property division award granting husband
who obtained divorce an amount approximating one-third standard and making cash settlement to wife in lieu of alimony was unfair and
unjust in denying wife her share of any increase in value of speculative mining investments by husband from funds jointly accumulated, so that decree was modified on appeal by
providing that sums awarded should not be
paid in lieu of alimony, and by directing trial
court to retain jurisdiction to make further
award in event husband realized on mining investments. Woolley v. Woolley, 113 Utah 391,
195 P.2d 743 (1948).
Awarding wife approximately four-fifths of
property accumulated by spouses during marriage was not an abuse of discretion where
family's savings and husband's schooling had
been made possible by wife's working throughout marriage, where husband's earning capacity had substantially increased as result of his
schooling whereas wife's had not and where
bulk of property would not have been accumulated if wife had not worked. Tremayne v.
Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 211 P.2d 452 (1949).
A divorce decree awarding property to wife,
but providing that if wife failed to pay an indebtedness, husband, who was the party at
fault, had the right to meet it, and to require
the wife to quitclaim the property to him, did
not give husband the right to acquire the property when wife became unable to pay off the
indebtedness, on account of mental and physical illness. Dixon v. Dixon, J21 Utah 259, 240
P.2d 1211 (1952).
This statute does not contemplate any discrimination or inequality in awards on the basis of sex, and the awards should be based upon
the needs of the parties and the equities of the
situation. Martinett v. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d
202, 331 P.2d 821 (1958).
Parties cannot by contract completely defeat
the authority expressly conferred upon the
court by this section; there can be no doubt of
the court's prerogative under this section to
make whatever disposition of property, including the rights in such a contract, as it deems
fair, equitable, and necessary for the protection
and welfare of the parties. Mathie v. Mathie,
12 Utah 2d 116, 363 P.2d 779 (1961).
Awarding wife $10,000 lump sum in lieu of
alimony was not an abuse of discretion, even
though marriage was of a comparatively short
duration, where wife spent about $23,000 on
family living expenses during marriage while
husband contributed only about $5,500 and
where husband had a net worth of $125,000 at
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one point during marriage, he thereafter purchased stock having value of $12,000 and value
of his assets increased during marriage. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 16 Utah 2d 179, 397 P.2d
987 (1965).
House jointly owned by spouses and awarded
to wife by divorce decree could serve as guarantee that minor child would be supported, and
thus it was not an abuse of discretion to deny
husband's request for sale of house and division of proceeds; rental which wife was collecting from the house would assure some income
to the wife and be a factor in determining how
much money husband should pay for support of
child. Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429
P.2d 35 (1967).
Counterclaim of husband for sum equal to
one-half the decrease of his assets during marriage was properly denied where evidence
showed that losses were not due to any fault on
the part of the wife. Cosgriff v. Murphy, 535
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1975).
This section neither authorizes nor prohibits
a party to a divorce proceeding from disposing
of assets during its pendency, but it does provide that the court may exercise its discretion
in ordering the division of property "when a
decree of divorce is made"; therefore, where
husband conveyed real property held in his
sole name between the time the divorce was
awarded and the time the final decree was
signed, the property conveyed was not part of
the assets subject to division, and the wife had
no rights therein. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562
P.2d 235 (Utah 1977).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding family home to wife subject to a
$10,000 lien in favor of the husband, since the
lien would not fall due until (1) the wife remarried, (2) the youngest child of the marriage
reached maturity, or (3) the home was sold.
Proudfit v. Proudfit, 598 P.2d 1318 (Utah
1979).
On appeal court would remand for evidentiary hearing under this section for determination of what was reasonable and necessary at
present time, where district court's order dividing property was ambiguous as to whether
value of home should be determined as of time
of divorce nine years earlier or as of time of
sale. LeBreton v. LeBreton, 604 P.2d 469 (Utah
1979).
Although court is governed by general principles of equity in making division of property,
when the decree is based on a property settlement agreement between the parties, equity
must take that agreement into consideration;
equity is not available to reinstate rights and
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply
because a party has come to regret the bargain
made; the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court where a property settlement
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agreement has been incorporated into the decree, and outright abrogation of provisions of
such an agreement is only resorted to with
great reluctance and for compelling reasons.
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980).
Where parties to property settlement agreement seemingly referred to "equity" in their
home in its usual and ordinary context, decree
applying that term as describing the money
value of the property in excess of claims or
liens against it was not an abuse of discretion
as against husband's claim that only amount of
first and second mortgages should have been
deducted and not also judgment liens; mere
fact that parties urged diverse definitions of
contract terminology did not render the agreement ambiguous so as to require resort to extrinsic evidence. Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248
(Utah 1980).
Where wife had relinquished all claims to
trust by property settlement agreement and
there were no compelling equitable considerations for abrogating that agreement, it was
error to award her a one-half interest in the
trust res. Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303
(Utah 1980).
Award of alimony should not be included as
a marital asset for purposes of a property division. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah
1980).
Equity in home purchased by husband subsequent to wife's filing for divorce and prior to
termination of marriage by divorce decree was
a marital asset subject to division; marital estate is evaluated according to the existing
property interests at the time the marriage is
terminated by the decree of the court. Fletcher
v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).
Investment funds were properly included as
a marital asset in the calculation of defendant's property settlement, and were not funds
held in trust for the children, where the funds
were held solely in defendant's name, there
had been no attempt to transfer such funds to
the children under the Uniform Gift to Minors
Act, defendant retained exclusive dominion
and control over the funds, and defendant had
done no more than declare an intention to use
such funds to benefit the children. Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).
Wife's settlement that she received as a result of a medical malpractice suit was one of
the total circumstances that trial court could
consider in making a just and practical allocation of the property and finances of parties to a
divorce action. Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d 49 (Utah
1981).
Where trial court properly has jurisdiction
over the parties in a divorce proceeding, Utah
law is applicable and that court has jurisdiction to award real property located in another
state to one of the parties in making a division
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If found not to be the father of the minor
of the marital property; such award may be
enforced by application to the Utah courts for child, the husband was entitled to an immedian order of conveyance directing a party to ate sale of the home to allow him to receive his
share of the equity. Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d
comply, and for contempt sanctions if that
party refuses. Dority v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56 106 (Utah 1986).
Even though the divorce decree awarded pos(Utah 1982).
Trial court's apportionment of marital prop- session, rather than ownership, of the marital
home to the wife, the husband was still reerty between the parties will not be disturbed
by the Supreme Court on appeal unless there is quired by the court to participate in the evensuch a manifest injustice or inequity as to indi- tual sale of the property because he did not
cate a clear abuse of discretion. Turner v. carry his burden of showing that the proposed
terms of the sale were unreasonable or inequiTurner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982).
Valuation of parties' assets subject to a prop- table to the parties. Booth v. Booth, 722 P.2d
771 (Utah 1986).
erty division is a matter for the trial court
The fact that title to property acquired durwhich will not be reviewed by the Supreme
ing the marriage was not in the spouses' joint
Court on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse
of discretion. Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 names and that the properties were purchased
with funds generated from the husband's other
(Utah 1982).
Trial court's division of property based on rental properties was not determinative of the
the principle that each party should, in gen- distribution to be made, and the trial court was
eral, receive the real and personal property he correct in holding that the properties were
marital property that could not have been acor she brought to the marriage or inherited
quired by plaintiff without the wife's contribuduring the marriage was proper where the parties in the divorce action had been married for tion toward household expenses. Huck v. Huck,
about seven years, had both been married be- 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986).
fore and had children from prior marriages,
Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances
and both had brought substantial properties to may be viewed as separate property, and in
their present marriage. Preston v. Preston, 646 appropriate circumstances, equity will require
P.2d 705 (Utah 1982).
that each party retain the separate property
Fact that title to real property may have
brought to the marriage. Burke v. Burke, 733
been in the name of one party prior to the di- P.2d 133 (Utah 1987).
vorce does not require trial court to award that
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in deproperty solely to that party in a property divi- clining to award the husband a portion of the
sion. Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 wife's inheritance where, except for having
(Utah 1982).
urged the wife to take her inheritance in land
Where trial court makes an equal division of rather than in cash, the husband conceded that
the value of a property, and gives one party the
he made no contribution toward the increase in
option of purchasing the other party's interest
value of the acreage in question and that the
at a purchase price of one-half the appraised
income came solely from the effects of inflation
value or to put the property on the market for on land values. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133
sale, if the party elects to sell the property and
(Utah 1987).
it is sold to a third party, the other party is
The trial court denied the wife her equitable
entitled to receive one-half of the actual sale
share of marital assets by refusing to place a
price, without interest, and not one-half of the
value on a corporation established by the husappraised value. Workman v. Workman, 652 band and his brother to allow a cash distribuP.2d 931 (Utah 1982).
tion to the wife, or, if it was unable to assign a
An in-kind distribution of closely held corpo- value, by failing to make an in-kind distriburate stock, whereby divorced husband was tion of the stock to her. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d
awarded 60% and the divorced wife 40% of the
1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
stock, was proper where the evidence failed to
An educational or professional degree is difestablish the stock value. Savage v. Savage,
ficult to value and such a valuation does not
658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983).
easily fit the common understanding of the
Whenever possible, continued joint owner- character of property. However, where the
ship by divorced spouses of closely held corpo- marriage is of long duration, present earnings
rate stock should he avoided in property divi- and business assets provide a more accurate
sions. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah
measure of the true worth of the wife's invest1983).
ment in her husband's degree. Gardner v.
First option agreements or other retirement
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988).
or redemptive agreements are not determinaUnder Subsection (1), the parties' premarital
tive in valuing corporate stock for purposes of a property is subject to division by the court, and
property division in a divorce case. Argyle v. the court must consider all the circumstances
Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984).
of the parties in determining the distribution
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ofreal and personal property, including the obligations of the parties for child and spousal
support. Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
As a general rule, pre-marital property,
gifts, and inheritances are separate property.
However, in appropriate circumstances, a
party may be awarded property that the other
spouse brought into the marriage. Naranjo v.
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding the wife all the proceeds from the
sale of a house owned by the husband before
the marriage, occupancy in another house, and
an equal share of stock purchased with money
received by the husband as a personal injury
judgment. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Gross inadequacy of the alimony available to
provide for the wife's needs, the paucity of her
separate premarital property, and the husband's relative wealth all warranted awarding
the wife a substantial portion of the husband's
premarital property. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d
1369 (Utah 1988).
Trial courts making an "equitable" property
division pursuant to this section should generally award property acquired by one spouse by
gift and inheritance during the marriage (or
property acquired in exchange thereoO to that
spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless: (1) the other
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or
protection of that property, thereby acquiring
an equitable interest in it; or (2) the property
has been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest
therein to the other spouse. Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988).

-Advanced degrees.
An advanced degree is or confers an intangible right which, because of its character, cannot properly be characterized as property subject to division between the spouses. Traditional alimony analysis is the appropriate and
adequate method for making adjustments between the parties in the cases of this type.
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah
1987).
An advanced degree or professional license is
not marital property subject to division upon
divorce. However, an advanced degree often accompanies a disparity in earning potential that
is appropriately considered as a factor in alimony analysis. Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d
238 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
A medical degree is not subject to valuation
and distribution in a divorce. Martinez v.
Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Wife was entitled to an award of "equitable
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restitution" in addition to traditional alimony,
where the marriage had continued for 17
years, there were three children, and the only
assets were a home and the enhanced earning
capacity of the husband, who had obtained a
medical degree four years before the divorce.
Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).

-Antenuptial agreement.
Although disposition of property under an
antenuptial agreement is valid, such an agreement cannot bind the court as to alimony.
Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
-Cohabitation.
"Cohabitation," which, under the divorce decree, requires enforcement of an equitable lien
on the home used by the custodial parent,
meant to dwell together in a common residence
and to participate in sexual contact that evidences a larger conjugal relationship. Haddow
v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985).
-Contributions.
Even if source of husband's contributions for
down payment on house were from sale of business prior to marriage, the difference in the
contributions made by both spouses was not so
great as to give rise to any abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court in dividing
equally the spouses' equity in their house and
lot. Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 1986).
-Discretion of court.
The trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interest of the parties,
and its actions are entitled to a presumption of
validity. Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781
(Utah 1986).
Because the court's distribution of property
is presumed valid, the court of appeals will not
disturb it on appeal unless it is clearly unjust
or a clear abuse of discretion. Rasband v.
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
-Evidence.
The trial court erred in assigning patents
owed by a spouse a value equal to the amount
of attorneys' fees expended to obtain the
patents, since the testimony at the trial was
that the patents were valueless, and the
amount of attorneys' fees has little, if any, relevance to the value of patents. Berger v. Berger,
713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985).
-Homestead right.
Trial court did not err in not setting off to
the wife a homestead in the property being divided, where her counsel did not raise an issue
at trial as to any homestead right she may
have had, and the judge, who made the property division at the time of the trial, would not
reopen that part of the case to relitigate the
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homestead issue. Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253
(Utah 1987).

-House.
Trial court's order that the parties alternate
every six months occupying and trying to sell
one of their homes was an abuse of discretion
because it hampered the parties' ability to pursue their separate lives and imposed burdensome and unnecessary expenses on the parties
by requiring them to move every six months
until the house was sold. Ruhsam v. Ruhsam,
742 P.2d 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
-Inheritances.
Simply because inheritances received by a
spouse came into the marriage many years earlier and were committed to the common venture of purchasing a home, the trial court is not
bound to divide this contribution equally between both parties; the appropriate treatment
of property brought into a marriage by one
party may vary from case to case. Newmeyer v.
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987).
-Modification.
Orders respecting disposition of the property
are continuing ordinarily, and subject to
change or modification, on allegations and
proof of changed conditions and circumstances
of the parties. Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 P.
781 (1916), overruled on other grounds,
Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975).
Divorced wife, seeking modification of decree
respecting property settlement, and dissatisfied with modification granted, may not file
new petition to re-try same issues, but should
file motion for new trial or appeal from decision. Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 293, 254 P.
784 (1927).
This statute has been construed, practically
since its enactment, to confer jurisdiction upon
the court to make changes with regard to the
distribution of property only in cases where
there has been a change in the circumstances
or condition of a party since the entry of the
original decree. Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259,
240 P.2d 1211 (1952).
Where a husband in a divorce action fraudulently induces the wife to rely upon a private
agreement as to the parties' property which the
husband had no intention of keeping, and not
to seek a distribution of the property in the
divorce decree, the fraud was extrinsic, and
constituted a valid ground for the subsequent
modification of the divorce decree as to the
property rights of the parties. Glover v. Glover,
121 Utah 362, 242 P.2d 298 (1952).
Where the defendant has subjected himself
to the jurisdiction of the court, a prior divorce
decree may be modified on the plaintiff's petition to show cause so as to include within it
property rights of the parties. Glover v. Glover,
121 Utah 362, 242 P.2d 298 (1952).

Modification of divorce decree to permit husband to sell house if he and children moved to
another city (which he did not do) did not constitute judgment awarding house to husband,
and did not divest wife of her interest as joint
tenant. Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah
1974).
Where original decree contained provision
that property settlement could be reviewed by
court within one year, supplemental decree adjusting distribution of property was proper.
Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975).
Property settlements, although entitled to a
greater sanctity than alimony and support
payments in proceedings to modify divorce decrees, are not sacrosanct and are not beyond
the power of a court of equity to modify; evidence of wife's remarriage and sale of her
house presented prima facie case of changed
circumstances which raised serious question as
to fairness and equity of continuing former
husband's obligation to make mortgage payments and required that trial court's determination be based on written findings and conclusions. Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah
1980).
Supreme Court refused to modify a stipulated property settlement on allegation by exwife that ex-husband had made nonfraudulent
misrepresentations as to the value of certain
property when she entered into the settlement
and that she relied on the values furnished by
her ex-husband because she was without funds
to have the property appraised. Christensen v.
Christensen, 619 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1980).
Where the property disposition is the product of an agreement and stipulation between
the parties which is sanctioned by the trial
court, the trial court should subsequently modify such a provision only with great reluctance
and upon a showing of compelling reasons.
Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981).
Where the trial court made no specific findings of fact fixing the value of marital assets,
but merely stated that the property distribution was "fair and equitable," it was not possible for the supreme court to determine whether
the property was actually distributed in an equitable manner. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1073
(Utah 1985).
Failure of the husband, who was primarily
responsible for repayment of a loan to a bank,
incurred prior to the parties' divorce, to repay
the loan, created a sufficient change of circumstances to justify the court's modification of the
decree, which was silent on the issue, so as to
require him to repay the loan. Thompson v.
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985).
Modification of a divorce decree by the consent of the parties, to give the wife permanent
custody of one child and custody of the other
two children for two weeks a year, constituted
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a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated in the original decree, which could
have warranted modification of the time for
payment of the wife's half of the equity in the
parties' house. Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P.2d 699
(Utah 1985).

--Spouses'
earning capacity.
The earning capacity of the husband having
been fully considered and taken into account in
arriving at an award of alimony, the property
distribution could not be challenged on the
ground that the wife was not awarded a share
of the present value of the husband's earning
capacity. Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah
1985).
-Reimbursement.
Husband was not entitled to reimbursement
for additions to the house prior to splitting the
equity nor for payments made by him from his
earnings during the marriage. Teece v. Teece,
715 P.2d 106 (Utah 1986).
-Retirement funds.
Court properly considered husband's accrued
retirement fund as property subject to an equitable disposition between the parties. Englert
v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978).
Retirement funds of husband which had a
definite present value, but which could not be
withdrawn until husband retired, which he
had not done, were marital assets the trial
court was required to consider in its determination of an equitable property division. Dogu
v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982).
If rights to pension or retirement benefits
are acquired during the marriage, the trial
court must at least consider those benefits in
making an equitable distribution of the marital assets. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d
431 (Utah 1982).
Where other marital assets available for equitable distribution were inadequate, and a
present value of husband's retirement benefits
was difficult if not impossible to ascertain because the value was contingent on the husband's decision to remain with his employer, in
distributing the retirement benefits as part of
the property distribution, it was proper for the
trial court to award the wife a deferred distribution based upon a fixed percentage of the
retirement benefits when received by the husband. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431
(Utah 1982).
Trial court erred in dividing husband's federal government retirement asset, where the
court's ten-year payout would have been unfair
and would have created immediate "financial
entanglements" which caused husband to
make yearly out-of-pocket payments to wife
rather than having the federal government accomplish the division pursuant to the decree of
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divorce. Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The distribution of retirement benefits
should generally be postponed until benefits
are received or at least until the earner is eligible to retire, especially where there is a sparsity of other divisible assets. However, the trial
court retains the discretion to divide the retirement account along with other assets at the
time the divorce is entered. If that discretion is
exercised, the court must make specific findings as to reasons for immediate distribution.
Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Military retirement benefits accrued in
whole or in part during marriage constitute
marital property under Utah law and are subject to division in a divorce proceeding. Greene
v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Trial court abused its discretion in awarding
plaintiff one-half of the parties' IRA without
making a finding as to the value of the IRA.
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Legal recognition of a new category of property rights after a divorce decree has been entered, is not itself sufficient to establish a substantial change in circumstances justifying a
reevaluation of a prior property division. Thus,
the decision in Woodward v. Woodward, 656
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), recognizing pension benefits as marital assets, should only be given
prospective application. Throckmorton v.
Throckmorton, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (Ct. App.
1988).

-Time of valuation.
Since a marital estate should be valued as of
the time of the divorce decree, the court erred
in valuing a spouse's corporation as of one year
before the trial rather than as of the time of
trial. Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah
1985).
Res judicata.
Where court determined that award was not
alimony, but was of such a nature as to establish accrued and vested judgments, and was
therefore not subject to modification, such determination was not res judicata in subsequent
proceedings to enforce decree on question of
whether award was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d
148 (1949).
Retention of jurisdiction.
It is good practice for the court to expressly
retain jurisdiction of the case to make such
changes in disposition of the property and payments to be made that may be necessary and
proper from time to time as the circumstances
and conditions of the parties may require.
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d
364 (1932).
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The fact that parent originally awarded custody of minor child under Utah divorce decree
had subsequently moved to South Dakota and
became a domiciliary there did not deprive
Utah court of its jurisdiction to modify prior
decree and award custody of the child to the
other parent after determining that the custodial parent had "neglected and abandoned"
him. Plumb v. Plumb, 555 P.2d 1205 (Utah
1976).

Right of action.
Although husband was required by terms of
divorce decree to pay third person certain sum
for use and benefit of minor children until they
should become of age, such third person could
not sue to recover payments, but right of action
was in wife. Hunt v. Monroe, 32 Utah 428, 91
P. 269, 11 L.R.A. (n.s.) 249 (1907).
Statute of limitations.
The eight-year statute of limitations applies
to past-due unpaid installments for alimony or
child support, and therefore judgment may be
rendered only for the arrearages within the
eight-year period; defendant was not entitled
to deductions for payments made during the
eight-year period upon being sued for the arrearages since the presumption is that a payment made without specific allocation is to be
applied against the oldest part of the debt.
Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975).
Stipulations and agreements of parties.
In a divorce action the trial court should
make such provision for alimony as the present
circumstances of the parties warrant, and any
stipulation of the parties in respect thereto
serves only as a recommendation to the court.
If the court adopts the suggestion of the parties
it does not thereby lose the right to make such
modification or change thereafter as may be
requested by either party based on some
change in circumstances warranting such modification. Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139
P.2d 222 (1943).
An agreement or stipulation between parties
to a divorce suit as to alimony or payments for
support of children is not binding upon the
court in entering a divorce decree, but serves
only as a recommendation, and if the court
adopts the suggestion of the parties it does not
thereby lose the right to make such modification or change thereafter as may be requested
by either party, based upon change of circumstances
warranting
such
modification.
Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d
944 (1953).
Divorce court is not duty bound to carry out
terms agreed upon by parties in stipulation as
to amount that should be paid to wife in lieu of
alimony and amount to be paid as child support. Madsen v. Madsen, 2 Utah 2d 423, 276
P.2d 917 (1954).

Where divorced parties entered into an
agreement reducing alimony and support payments provided for in the original divorce decree and defendant later breached the agreement, the fact that the defendant did not willfully breach the agreement and was not in contempt of court did not affect the right of the
plaintiff to enforce the terms of the agreement
and to refuse to waive the accumulations under
the decree. Wallis v. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237,342
P.2d 103 (1959).
Where, at hearing to amend divorce decree,
stipulation was made in open court stating
that husband was $600 in arrears in his payment of alimony and support, but wife later
filed letter with court stating that arrearage
was actually $1,600, court was not obligated to
consider self-serving statement in letter and
properly amended decree in accordance with
stipulation. Flannery v. Flannery, 536 P.2d
136 (Utah 1975).
Where decedent agreed to maintain insurance he had at time of divorce with his ex-wife
as beneficiary, and he remarried and changed
beneficiary to second wife, ex-wife was entitled
to amount of insurance held as of date of divorce decree, and second wife was entitled to
excess. Madsen v. Estate of Moffitt, 542 P.2d
187 (Utah 1975).
Where husband objected to entry of consent
decree on grounds that he did not know the
terms of the decree when he agreed to it, and
that he agreed to it under duress, it was within
discretion of trial court to accept or reject the
decree, since it was in a position to determine
whether husband had actually agreed to be
bound; but court itself was under no obligation
to adhere to an agreement between the parties,
since distribution of property was a matter
within its discretion. Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d
472 (Utah 1975).
The parties to a divorce decree cannot, by
their own act, make a binding settlement of
obligations for support or alimony running between them; the continuing jurisdiction of the
court permits it to modify these obligations
notwithstanding any agreement of the parties.
Strong v. Strong, 548 P.2d 626 (Utah 1976).

Suit to set aside fraudulent conveyance.
In action by wife for divorce and to set aside
alleged fraudulent conveyance of real property
from husband to his father, complaint would
not be sustained as creditors' bill where it did
not show that plaintiff had procured judgment
or that defendant was insolvent. Adamson v.
Adamson, 55 Utah 544, 188 P. 635 (1920).
Divorce decree which incorporated a stipulation executed by the former husband and wife
providing that the husband be deprived of all
parental rights and obligations in regard to his
children was not effective to terminate the husband's parental rights and obligations where

470

DIVORCE
the divorce decree had been entered without
holding a hearing on the termination issue as
required by § 78-3a-48; therefore, trial court
had jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree to
require the husband to provide support for his
minor children. Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516
(Utah 1981).

Trustee for wife.
In divorce proceeding, appointment of
trustee to manage alimony which had been
awarded wife was notjustified, where wife was
mentally competent and not a spendthrift.
Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 306, 121 P. 19, 38
L.R.A. (n.s.) 269, 1914D Ann. Cas. 989 (1912).
Visitation rights.
Under proper circumstances, a court may
make support payments conditional upon the
child's custodian making the child available
for the exercise of the other party's visitation
rights. Earl v. Earl, 17 Utah 2d 156, 406 P.2d
302 (1965).
Ex-wife who refused to allow former husband to visit children and did not answer contempt citation was not entitled to collect child
support until she purged herself of contempt.
Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah
1974).
If a stepparent is in loco parentis to his stepchild, he is entitled to a hearing to determine
his rights to visitation with his stepchild.
Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).
The visitation rights of a child legitimated
pursuant to§ 78-30-12, concerning adoption of
illegitimate child by acknowledgment of natural father, are to be determined pursuant to
this section. Slade v. Dennis, 594 P.2d 898
(Utah 1979).
Reviewing court declined to condition divorced father's obligation to provide child support upon former wife's compliance with his
legally prescribed minimal rights of visitation.
Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah
1980).
While a parent's sexuality in and of itself is
not alone a sufficient basis upon which to deny
completely a parent's right to custody of minor
children, the manifestation of one's sexuality
and the resulting behavior patterns are relevant to custody and to the nature and scope of
visitation rights. Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d
641 (Utah 1980).
Modification of visitation rights provided in
divorce decree requires bifurcated procedure
similar to that required for modification of
child custody award in which first step involves determination that a substantial and
material change in circumstances has occurred
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since time of decree to justify a reconsideration
of visitation rights, and after that determination is satisfied, second part of proceeding involves a "best interest" analysis. Hogge v.
Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982); Becker v.
Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that custodial parent's move with
child to another state did not constitute material change in circumstances justifying reopening of custody decree for purposes of modification where noncustodial parent, who was seeking such modification, did not show that custodial circumstances of child or parenting capabilities of custodial parent would be affected by
move; however, move did constitute a material
change in circumstances in regard to visitation
rights to warrant modification of noncustodial
parent's visitation rights. Becker v. Becker,
694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984).
A trial court should not place the visitation
rights of one party within the discretion of the
custodial party's attorney because the attorney
is thereby placed in the ethically untenable position of representing both his client and the
court. Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 (Utah
1985).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a finding of contempt to remain in the
record where the trial court permitted the wife
to purge herself of contempt by bringing the
children back to Utah within ten days so that
the defendant could visit them but she failed to
do so until eight months later. Race v. Race,
740 P.2d 253 (Utah 1987).
Concomitant with the rights of a legitimated
child adopted by the acknowledgement of its
father are the rights of its biological father. In
a dispute with the child's mother over visitation rights or custody, the biological father's
rights with respect to the legitimated child are
adjudicated under the divorce laws codified in
this section and § 30-3-10. Chandler v.
Mathews, 734 P.2d 907 (Utah 1987).

Voluntary support payments.
Divorced father's contributions to the support of his 25-year-old son, who was not disabled or limited in his ability to support himself, were voluntary payments and had no effect on the amount of support owed to his former wife and other minor children as set out in
the divorce decree. Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d
1274 (Utah 1978).
Cited in Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah
1987); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 754 P.2d 84 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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Appeal:
- remarriage as affecting right to appeal
from divorce decree, 29 A.L.R.3d 1167.
- acceptance of payments under alimony or
property settlement or child support provisions
of divorce judgment as precluding appeal
therefrom, 29 A.L.R.3d 1184.
Divorced or separated spouse's living with
member of opposite sex as affecting other
spouse's obligation of alimony or support under
separation agreement, 4 7 A.L.R.4th 38.
Child custody:
- habeas corpus, child custody provisions of
divorce or separation decree as subject to modification on habeas corpus, 4 A.L.R.3d 1277.
- child's wishes as factor in awarding custody, 4 A.L.R.3d 1396.
- guilty party, award of custody of child to
parent against whom divorce is granted, 23
A.L.R.3d 6.
- grandparents, award of custody where
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- grandparents, award of custody of child
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A.L.R.3d 290.
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for termination of parent's right to child, 58
A.L.R.3d 1074.
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right in child custody proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d
1337.
- maternal preference rule or presumption
in child custody cases, modern status, 70
A.L.R.3d 262.
- psychiatric or mental examination for
party seeking to obtain or retain custody of
child, right to require, 99 A.L.R.3d 268.
- sexual relations of custodial parent with
third person as justifying modification of child
custody order, 100 A.L.R.3d 625.
Attorneys' fee awards in parent-nonparent
child custody cases, 45 A.L.R.4th 212.
Liability of legal or natural parent, or one
who aids and abets, for damages resulting from
abduction of own child, 49 A.L.R.4th 7.
Parent's transsexuality as factor in award of
custody of children, visitation rights, or termination of parental rights, 59 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Right to attorneys' fees in proceeding, after
absolute divorce, for modification of child custody or support order, 57 A.L.R.4th 710.
Child support:
- undivided award for support of more than
one person, propriety and effect of, 2 A.L.R.3d
596.
- trusts, court's establishment to secure alimony or child support in divorce proceedings, 3
A.L.R.3d 1170.
- court's power in habeas corpus proceedings relating to custody of child to adjudicate
questions as to child's support, 17 A.L.R.3d
764.
- voluntary acts of child, other than marriage or entry into military service, which terminate parent's obligation to support, 32
A.L.R.3d 1055.
- education of child, noncustodial parent's
rights as respects, 36 A.L.R.3d 1093.
- income of child from other source as excusing parent's compliance with support provisions of divorce decree, 39 A.L.R.3d 1292.
- credit, right to credit on accrued support
payments for time child is in father's custody
or for other voluntary expenditures, 47
A.L.R.3d 1031.
- power of court to modify decree for support of child which was based on agreement of
parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 657.
- father's liability for support of child furnished after divorce decree which awarded custody to mother but made no provision for support, 91 A.L.R.3d 530.
- parent's obligation to support unmarried
minor child who refuses to live with parent, 98
A.L.R.3d 334.
- mother's duty to pay support for children
in custody of father, propriety of decree in proceeding between divorced parents to determine, 98 A.L.R.3d 1146.
- college education of child, responsibility of
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noncustodial divorced parent to pay for, or contribute to, costs of, 99 A.L.R.3d 322.
- validity and effect, as between former
spouses, of agreement releasing parent from
payment of child support provided for in an
earlier divorce decree, 100 A.L.R.3d 1129.
- social worker's expert testimony, admissibility on custody issue, 1 A.L.R.4th 837.
- physical disability or handicap of parent
as factor in custody award or proceedings, 3
A.L.R.4th 1044.
- !aches or acquiescence as defense, so as to
bar recovery of arrearage of permanent alimony or child support, 5 A.L.R.4th 1015.
- homosexual or lesbian parent, initial
award or denial of child custody to, 6 A.L.R.4th
1297.
- removal by custodial parents of child from
jurisdiction in violation of court order as justifying termination, suspension, or reduction of
child support payments, 8 A.L.R.4th 1231.
- stepparent, award where contest between
natural parent and stepparent, 10 A.L.R.4th
767.
- race as factor in custody award or proceedings, 10 A.L.R.4th 796.
- desire of child as to geographical location
of residence or domicile as factor in awarding
custody or terminating parental rights, 10
A.L.R.4th 827.
- joint custody of children, propriety of
awarding, 17 A.L.R.4th 1013.
- escalation clause in divorce decree relating to alimony and child support, validity and
enforceability, 19 A.L.R.4th 830.
- foreign country, propriety of awarding
custody of child to parent residing or intending
to reside in, 20 A.L.R.4th 677.
- religion as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 22 A.L.R.4th 971.
- remarriage of spouses to each other, effect
on child custody and support provisions of prior
divorce decree, 26 A.L.R.4th 325.
- excessiveness or adequacy of money
awarded as child support, 27 A.L.R.4th 864.
- excessiveness or adequacy of amount of
money awarded for alimony and child support
combined, 27 A.L.R.4th 1038.
Stepparent's postdivorce duty to support
stepchild, 44 A.L.R.4th 520.
Child support: court's authority to reinstitute parent's support obligation after terms of
prior decree have been fulfilled, 48 A.L.R.4th
953.
Right to attorneys' fees in proceeding, after
absolute divorce, for modification of child custody or support order, 57 A.L.R.4th 710.
Divorce: voluntary contributions to child's
education expenses as factor justifying modification of spousal support award, 63 A.L.R.4th
436.
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Insurance:
- property settlement agreement as affecting divorced spouse's right to recover as named
beneficiary under former spouse's life insurance policy, 31 A.L.R.4th 59.
- provision in decree that one party obtain
or maintain life insurance for benefit of other
party or child, 59 A.L.R.3d 9.
Property settlement:
- jurisdiction on constructive or substituted
service, in divorce or alimony action, to reach
property within state, 10 A.L.R.3d 212.
real property in another state, power of divorce court to deal with, 34 A.L.R.3d 962.
- right of child to enforce provisions for his
benefit in parents' separation or property settlement agreement, 34 A.L.R.3d 1357.
- mutual mistake as to tax consequences as
ground for relief against property settlement,
39 A.L.R.3d 1376.
- tax liability or consequences, consideration in determining alimony or property settlement provisions, 51 A.L.R.3d 461.
- remarriage pending appeal as precluding
party from attacking property settlement of divorce decree, 55 A.L.R.3d 1299.
- third persons' property claims, propriety
of consideration and disposition in divorce litigation, 63 A.L.R.3d 373.
- pension or retirement benefits as subject
to award or division by court in settlement of
property rights between spouses, 94 A.L.R.3d
176.
- action based upon reconveyance, upon
promise of reconciliation, of property realized
from divorce award or settlement, 99 A.L.R.3d
1248.
- professional degree or license as marital
property for purposes of alimony, support, or
property settlement, 4 A.L.R.4th 1294.
- children's needs, effect of trial court giving consideration to, in making property division - modern cases, 19 A.L.R.4th 239.
- appreciation in value of separate property
during marriage without contribution by either spouse as separate or community property, 24 A.L.R.4th 453.
Divorce or separation: treatment of stock options for purposes of dividing marital property,
46 A.L.R.4th 640.
Valuation of stock options for purposes of divorce court's property distribution,
46
A.L.R.4th 689.
Necessity that divorce court value property
before distributing it, 51 A.L.R.4th 11.
Divorce and separation: method of valuation
of life insurance policies in connection with
trial court's division of property, 51 A.L.R.4th
1203.

Divorce: excessiveness or adequacy of combined property division and spousal support
awards--modern cases, 55 A.L.R.4th 14.
Divorce: excessiveness or adequacy of trial
court's property award-modern
cases, 56
A.L.R.4th 12.
Divorce: propriety of property distribution
leaving both parties with substantial ownership interest in same business, 56 A.L.R.4th
862.
Divorce property distribution: real estate or
trust property in which interest vested before
marriage and was realized during marriage, 60
A.L.R.4th 217.
Divorce property distribution: treatment and
method of valuation of future interest in real
estate or trust property not realized during
marriage, 62 A.L.R.4th 107.
Visitation rights:
- withholding visitation rights for failure to
make alimony or support payments, 51
A.L.R.3d 520.
grandparents'
visitation rights, 90
A.L.R.3d 222.
- persons other than natural parents or
grandparents, visitation rights of, 1 A.L.R.4th
1270.
- interference by custodian of child with
noncustodial parent's visitation rights as
ground for change of custody, 28 A.L.R.4th 9.
Parent's transsexuality as factor in award of
custody of children, visitation rights, or termination of parental rights, 59 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Withholding visitation rights for failure to
make alimony or support payments, 65
A.L.R.4th 1155.
Paternity, effect in subsequent proceedings,
of paternity findings or implications in divorce
or annulment decree or in support or custody
made incident thereto, 78 A.L.R.3d 846.
Receiver, appointment or discharge for marital or community property necessitated by suit
for divorce or separation, 15 A.L.R.4th 224.
Liability of spouse, after divorce, for community debt contracted by other spouse during
marriage, 20 A.L.R.4th 211.
Right to jury trial in state court divorce proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.
Antenuptial contracts: parties' behavior during marriage as abandonment, estoppel, or
waiver regarding contractual rights, 56
A.L.R.4th 998.
Divorce: order requiring that party not compete with former marital business, 59
A.L.R.4th 1075.
Prejudgment interest awards in divorce
cases, 62 A.L.R.4th 156.
Key Numbers. - Divorcee=, 199 et seq.
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30-3-5.1. Provision for income withholding in child support order.
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, it shall include in the
order a provision for withholding income as a means of collecting child support as provided in Chapter 45d, Title 78.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-5.1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 11, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. - Chapter 45d, Title 78,

referred to in this section, was repealed by
Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407. For the present comparable provision, see § 62A-ll-403.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Note, "New Standards for Child Support Enforcement in Utah,"
1986 Utah L. Rev. 591.

30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse
- Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for modification of a
divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or child sexual abuse is made,
implicating either party, the court shall order that an investigation be conducted by the Division of Family Services within the Department of Social
Services in accordance with Part 5, Chapter 4 of Title 62A. A final award of
custody or visitation may not be rendered until a report on that investigation
is received by the court. That investigation shall be conducted by the Division
of Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and request for an
investigation.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-5.2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 90, § 1.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, ch. 90 be-

comes effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, § 25.

30-3-6. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 30-3-6 (L. 1909, ch. 109,

§ 1; 1913, ch. 49, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 3001; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-6; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1;

1969, ch. 72, § 4), relating to the period of an
interlocutory decree, was repealed by Laws
1985, ch. 33, § 2.

30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute.
The decree of divorce becomes absolute on the date it is signed by the court
and entered by the clerk in the register of actions or at the expiration of a
period of time the court may specifically designate, unless an appeal or other
proceedings for review are pending or the court, before the decree becomes
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders. The court, upon application or
on its own motion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a desig475
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nated period of time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to exceed six
months from the signing and entry of the decree.
History: L. 1909, ch. 109, § 2; 1913, ch. 49,
§ l; C.L. 1917, § 3002; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
40-3-7; L. 1957, ch. 55, § l; 1969, ch. 72, § 5;
1985, ch. 33, § I.

Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amendment rewrote the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action to set aside judgment.
Death before decree absolute.
Effect of former adjudication.
-Motion to set aside judgment.
Opening, amending and vacating.
Reconciliation before decree absolute.
Time for appeal.
Workers' compensation.
Action to set aside judgment.
Trial court has power to entertain an independent common-law action to set aside a divorce decree for fraud or duress. St. Pierre v.
Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982).
Death before decree absolute.
When one or both of the parties dies after
entry of divorce decree but before decree is
final, the decree becomes ineffective and is of
no further force or effect. Daly v. Daly, 533
P.2d 884 (Utah 1975).
Effect of former adjudication.
Decree denying husband divorce on ground
of cruelty did not bar husband's action for divorce on ground of desertion where question of
desertion was not involved in former action,
and hence, was not adjudicated. Hyrup v.
Hyrup, 70 Utah 274, 259 P. 925 (1927).
The final judgment in divorce action settles
all property rights of the parties, and is a bar
to action afterwards brought by either party to
determine the question of alimony, or any
property rights which might have been settled
by the judgment. Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah 60,
291 P. 298 (1930).
-Motion to set aside judgment.
It was proper to deny a divorced wife's motion to set aside or modify a divorce decree on
ground of misrepresentation and fraud by the
husband, where the parties and witnesses had
been present at the trial and these issues had
been contested during the trial. Haner v.
Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d 577 (1962).
Opening, amending and vacating.
Motion to vacate findings and decree, and to

enter judgment in favor of defendant in suit for
divorce, which was made before interlocutory
decree became final, prevented divorce from
becoming absolute until interlocutory period
had elapsed after court disposed of application
or motion. Spencer v. Clark, 54 Utah 83, 179 P.
741 (1919).
Court had no power to set aside interlocutory
decree of divorce, without notice and opportunity to be heard. Rasmussen v. Call, 55 Utah
597, 188 P. 275 (1920).
Divorce decree never became absolute where
a motion objecting to the findings and conclusion of the court was stricken from the calendar and not heard on the merits due to a failure of both parties to appear at the hearing
date on the motion. Glad v. Glad, 567 P.2d 160
(Utah 1977).
Reconciliation before decree absolute.
A motion to vacate a divorce decree on the
ground of reconciliation is appropriate during
the interlocutory period if the parties both indicate that they have reconciled or that they
have a desire to do so, but such a motion is not
proper where one of the parties unilaterally
attempts to so proceed against the obvious opposition of the other. Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah
2d 299, 373 P.2d 577 (1962).
Time for appeal.
Unless subsequent authorized proceedings
intervene, the decree stands as the final determination of the litigation for purposes of appeal. Accordingly, there being but one decree
and one date of entry, it follows that time for
taking an appeal is computed from date of
entry of the decree. Allred v. Wood, 72 Utah
427, 270 P. 1089 (1928).
Workers' compensation.
Where deceased employee and wife had been
divorced, and had ceased to cohabit and live
together as husband and wife long before injury and death, she was not entitled to compensation as dependent. Wesley v. Industrial
Comm'n, 60 Utah 415, 209 P. 337 (1922).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Power of court to vacate decree of
divorce or separation upon request of both parties, 3 A.L.R3d 1216.

30-3-8.

Remarriage

Right of one spouse, over objection, to voluntarily dismiss claim for divorce, annulment, or
similar marital relief, 16 A.L.R.3d 283.

When unlawful.

Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their marriage by
decree may marry any person other than the spouse from whom the divorce
was granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is taken, the divorce is not
absolute until after affirmance of the decree.
History: L. 1909, ch. 109, § 3; C.L. 1917,
§ 3003; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-8; L. 1969,
ch. 72, § 6; 1988, ch. 154, § 3.

Amendment Notes. - The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, so rewrote the

section as to make a detailed comparison impracticable.
Cross-References. - Prohibited and void
marriages, § 30-1-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
A second marriage contracted within the interlocutory period of a prior divorce decree is
void. Anderson v. Anderson, 121 Utah 237,240
P.2d 966 (1952).

ANALYSIS

Effect of premature remarriage.
Former law.
-Constitutionality.
Remarriage after California divorce.

Former law.

Effect of premature remarriage.
The fact that wife, in violation of statute,
contracted new marriage before interlocutory
decree became absolute did not require that
decree awarding her custody of minor child be
modified. Calvert v. Calvert, 52 Utah 598, 176
P. 731 (1918).
Where woman remarried before interlocutory decree became absoiute, marriage was
void ab initio in view of this section and
§ 30-1-2, and industrial commission did not err
in so finding since no decree of court was necessary to determine that marriage was a nullity.
Sanders v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 Utah 372,
230 P. 1026 (1924).
Applicant for compensation for death of employee held not entitled thereto where she was
not his legal widow, her marriage to him being
void under this section and§ 30-1-2 because it
was contracted before divorce decree became
final. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 65
Utah 100, 234 P. 697 (1925).
A new marriage contracted during the interlocutory period is void ab initio. Hendrich v.
Anderson, 191 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1951).

-Constitutionality.
Former provision prohibiting remarriage of
one in arrears under prior support obligation
(deleted from this section by 1988 amendment)
was unconstitutional. Cooper v. Utah, 684 F.
Supp. 1060 (D. Utah 1987).
Remarriage after California divorce.
California law requiring the expiration of a
year from the filing of the interlocutory divorce
decree before entry of a final judgment and
permitting the entry of a final judgment nunc
pro tune was not contrary to the public policy
of Utah. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342
P.2d 94 (1959).
Where a wife obtained an interlocutory divorce decree in California and, subsequent to
the expiration of one year therefrom, married a
second husband and later applied for and received a nunc pro tune final divorce judgment
dated prior to the second marriage, the second
marriage was valid. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah
2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation § 432.
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C.J.S. - 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 764.
Key Numbers. - Divorce
320.

30-3-9

30-3-9.
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Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 30-3-9 (R.S. 1898 & C.L.
1907, § 1213; C.L. 1917, § 3005; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 40-3-9), relating to the forfeiture of

30-3-10.

marital rights by the guilty party in a divorce
proceeding, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 72,
§ 26.

Custody of children in case of separation
vorce - Custody consideration.

or di-

(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the
future care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. In
determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties.
The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are not
controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
History: L. 1903, ch. 82,

§

l; C.L. 1907,

§ 1212x; C.L. 1917, § 3004; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 40-3-10; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 7; 1977, ch.

122, § 5; 1988, ch. 106, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the
former provisions as Subsection (1), added Sub-

section (2), and made various stylistic and
punctuation changes in Subsection (1).
Cross-References. - Disposition of property and children, § 30-3-5.
Removal of children from homestead,
§ 30-2-10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeals.
Application of section.
Children's choice.
Factors in determining child's best interest.
-Improper factors.
-Moral· character.
Findings of foreign court.
Findings required.
Modification.
Preference for mother.
Presumption in favor of natural parents.
Retention of jurisdiction pending appeal.
Standard for determining custody.
Appeals.
In child custody determinations, the trial
court's decision should be upheld on appeal unless the trial court's action is so flagrantly
unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981),
overruled on other grounds, Pusey v. Pusey,
728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
A determination of the "best interests of the
child" turns on factors the trial court is best

able to assess, and only when the action taken
by the trial court is so unjust as to constitute
an abuse of discretion should the Supreme
Court substitute its own judgment. Hirsch v.
Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1986).
Application of section.
Where father of an illegitimate child had
adopted such child by acknowledgment under
§ 78-30-12, and the father and mother of the
child had never married, the standards of this
section were employed in an action between
the mother and father for custody of the child.
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981),
overruled on other grounds, Pusey v. Pusey,
728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
Concomitant with the rights of a legitimated
child adopted by the acknowledgement of its
father are the rights of its biological father. In
a dispute with the child's mother over visitation rights or custody, the biological father's
rights with respect to the legitimated child are
adjudicated under the divorce laws codified in
§ 30-3-5 and
this section. Chandler v.
Mathews, 734 P.2d 907 (Utah 1987).
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Children's choice.
Although it may have been irregular, it was
not error for the judge to talk to the children
alone in his chambers and then announce the
results of their preferences. Although it is desirable to have the parties stipulate to the
court's means of determining children's preference, there was no claim that the children were
improperly influenced or that the selection indicated was not correct. Austad v. Austad, 2
Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284, 48 A.L.R.2d 256
(1954).
Award of custody to wife was not an abuse of
discretion notwithstanding expression of two
older children that they preferred to live with
father and that divorce was granted on husband's counterclaim of mental cruelty. Baker
v. Baker, 25 Utah 2d 337, 481 P.2d 672 (1971).
Factors in determining child's best interest.
In making a custody determination, factors
trial court may consider in determining the
child's best interests include: the preference of
the child; keeping siblings together; the relative strength of the child's bond with one or
both of the prospective custodians; the general
interest in continuing previously determined
custody arrangements where the child is happy
and well adjusted; a prospective custodian's
moral character and emotional stability, duration and depth of desire for custody, and ability
to provide personal rather than surrogate care;
significant impairment of prospective custodian's ability to function as a parent through
drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause;
reasons for having relinquished custody in the
past; prospective custodian's religious compatibility with the child; kinship, including, in extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status;
and financial condition of the prospective custodian. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38
(Utah 1982).
Function-related factors, rather than gender-related factors, should be the basis for determining child custody, including prominently the identity of the primary caretaker
during the marriage as well as which parent
has greater flexibility to provide personal care
for the child, with which parent the child has
spent more time pending custody determination, and the stability of the environment provided by each parent. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d
117 (Utah 1986).
Moral character is only one of a myriad of
factors the court may properly consider in determining a child's best interests. Sanderson v.
Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987).
A finding that a parent practices polygamy
is alone insufficient to support a custody award
or to permit meaningful review on appeal; instead, polygamous practices should only be
considered as one among many other factors

30-3-10

regarding
the children's best interests.
Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987).

-Improper factors.
Trial court's findings were neither sufficient
nor logical in determining the best interests of
the children, where the findings were biased
against divorced women, an urban environment, and women who pursue roles other than
the traditional role of a homemaker. Marchant
v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
-Moral character.
In determining best interest of the child, father's insensitivity to the mother and his failure to legitimate his child by marriage were
not unreasonable considerations of past conduct and demonstrated moral standards.
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981),
overruled on other grounds, Pusey v. Pusey,
728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
Findings of foreign court.
In view of this section, finding of Canadian
court in alimony proceeding that wife was
guilty of adultery would not warrant depriving
her of custody of child in habeas corpus proceeding in Utah, though full faith and credit be
given Canadian judgment and though adulterous wife could not have custody of child in Canada, where there was no allegation that wife
was unfit and custody of child was not involved
in alimony proceeding, child's welfare being
paramount consideration where custody is involved. Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83
(1926).
Interlocutory order of Canadian court awarding temporary custody to father is not conclusive on Utah court in habeas corpus proceeding
involving custody of child as between parents,
since court need not give order of foreign court
any greater effect than it would have where
issued, and, therefore, it is subject to modification or rescission in Utah. Cooke v. Cooke, 67
Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926).
Findings required.
The trial court must enter specific findings
on the factors relied upon in awarding custody
of a child in a divorce case. Hutchison v.
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982).
Modification.
The fact that the mother did not assume the
role of custodial parent following the divorce
constituted a material change of circumstances
which warranted reopening the question of
custody, and a change in custody from the
mother to the father was affirmed where the
father assumed the role of custodial parent and
provided the child with a permanent residence
and a stable home life. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1986).
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Preference for mother.
The judicial preference for placing young
children in the mother's custody when all other
things are equal was repudiated in Pusey v.
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
Presumption in favor of natural parent.
While the best interest of the child is the
paramount consideration in a custody dispute,
there is a presumption in favor of the natural
parent in a custody dispute between a natural
parent and a nonparent; while this parental
presumption is not conclusive, it cannot be rebutted merely by demonstrating that the nonparent possesses superior qualifications, has
established a deeper bond with the child, or is
able to provide more desirable circumstances,
but can be rebutted only by evidence establishing that a parent at a particular time generally
lacks all three of the characteristics that give
rise to the presumption, namely: that no strong
mutual bond exists between the parent and
child; that the parent has not demonstrated a
willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest
and welfare for the child's; and that the parent
lacks sympathy for and understanding of the
child that is characteristic of parents generally; if the parental presumption is rebutted,
the parent and nonparent compete on equal
footing, and the custody award should be determined solely by reference to the best interests
of the child. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d
38 (Utah 1982).

The standard for determining custody arrangements is the best interest of the child,
with a presumption in favor of the natural parent in a custody dispute between a natural parent and a nonparent. Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649
P.2d 88 (Utah 1982).

Retention of jurisdiction pending appeal.
In habeas corpus proceeding by divorced
mother residing in Texas against father for
custody of child living with father in Utah,
wherein custody was awarded to mother who
thereupon took child to Texas, trial court
should have retained jurisdiction over child
long enough to allow father to have presented
matter on appeal to Supreme Court. Briggs v.
Briggs, 111 Utah 418, 181 P.2d 223 (1947).
Standard for determining custody.
A natural parent may be deprived of custody
of a child on a less compelling showing than is
required for termination of all parental rights.
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah
1982).
After finding changes in circumstances in a
proceeding for modification of custody, the trial
court is not required to determine merely what
is reasonable and necessary for the welfare of
the child; rather, it must decide what is reasonable and necessary for the best interests of the
child, a standard which may frequently and of
necessity require a choice between good and
better. Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah
1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Note, "Joint Custody:
Dividing the Indivisible," 1986 Utah L. Rev.
577.
Recent Developments in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions - Family Law, 1987 Utah L.
Rev. 200.
Brigham Young Law Review. - Modification of Child Custody Predicated on Cohabitation of the Custodial Parent: Jarrett v. Jarrett,
1981 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 169.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation §§ 974-981; 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and Wife § 402; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent
and Child §§ 23-45.
C.J.S. - 27C C.J.S. Divorce §§ 618-628; 42
C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 625; 67A C.J.S.
Parent and Child §§ 16-30.
A.L.R. - Habeas corpus: child custody provisions of divorce or separation decree as subject to modification on habeas corpus, 4
A.L.R.3d 1277.
Child's wishes as factor in awarding custody,
4 A.L.R.3d 1396.
Power of court which denied divorce, legal
separation, or annulment, to award custody or

make provisions for support of child, 7
A.L.R.3d 1096.
Award of custody of child to parent against
whom divorce is decreed, 23 A.L.R.3d 6.
Grandparents: award of custody of child
where contest is between child's father and
grandparent, 25 A.L.R.3d 7.
Grandparents: award of custody of child
where contest is between child's mother and
grandparent, 29 A.L.R.3d 366.
Grandparents: award of custody of child
where contest is between child's grandparent
and one other than child's parent, 30 A.L.R.3d
290.
Grandparents: award of custody of child
where contest is between child's parents and
grandparents, 31 A.L.R.3d 1187.
Physical abuse of child by parent as ground
for termination of parent's right to child, 53
A.L.R.3d 605.
Sexual abuse of child by parent as ground for
termination of parent's right to child, 58
A.L.R.3d 1074.
Cross-examination: right, in child custody
proceedings, to cross-examine investigating of-
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fleer whose report is used by court in its decision, 59 A.L.R.3d 1337.
Maternal preference rule or presumption in
child custody, modern status, 70 A.L.R.3d 262.
Psychiatric or mental examination for party
seeking to obtain or retain custody of child,
right to require, 99 A.L.R.3d 268.
Sexual relations of custodial parent with
third person as justifying modification of child
custody order, 100 A.L.R.3d 625.
Social worker's expert testimony, admissibility on custody issue, 1 A.L.R.4th 837.
Physical disability or handicap of parent as
factor in custody award or proceedings, 3
A.L.R.4th 1044.
Homosexual or lesbian parent, initial award
or denial of child custody to, 6 A.L.R.4th 1297.
Stepparent, award where contest between
natural parent and stepparent, 10 A.L.R.4th
767.
Race as factor in custody award or proceedings, 10 A.L.R.4th 796.
Child's desire as to geographical location of
residence or domicile as factor in awarding custody or terminating parental rights, 10
A.L.R.4th 827.
Necessity of requiring presence in court of
both parties in proceedings relating to custody
or visitation of children, 15 A.L.R.4th 864.

30-3-10.2

Joint custody of children, propriety of awarding, 17 A.L.R.4th 1013.
Foreign country, propriety of awarding custody of child to parent residing or intending to
reside in, 20 A.L.R.4th 677.
Religion as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 22 A.L.R.4th 971.
Stepparent's postdivorce duty to support
stepchild, 44 A.L.R.4th 520.
Attorneys' fees awards in parent-nonparent
child custody cases, 45 A.L.R.4th 212.
Liability of legal or natural parent, or one
who aids and abets, for damages resulting from
abduction of own child, 49 A.L.R.4th 7.
Right to jury trial in state court divorce proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.
Parent's transsexuality as factor in award of
custody of children, visitation rights, or termination of parental rights, 59 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Mother's status as "working mother" as factor in awarding child custody, 62 A.L.R.4th
259.
Withholding visitation rights for failure to
make alimony or support payments, 65
A.L.R.4th 1155.
Key Numbers. - Divorce 41->298; Husband
and Wife 41-> 299½; Parent and Child 41-> 2.

30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined.
In this chapter, 'Joint legal custody":
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a
parent by both parents, where specified;
(2) may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one
parent to make specific decisions;
(3) does not affect the physical custody of the child except as specified
in the order of joint legal custody;
(4) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical
custody of and access to the child to each of the parents, as the best
interest of the child often requires that a primary physical residence for
the child be designated; and
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the child.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.1, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 106, § 2.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, ch. 106 be-

comes effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, § 25.

30-3-10.2. Joint legal custody order - Factors for court
determination - Public assistance.
(1) There is a rebuttable presumption, subject to Subsection (2), that joint
legal custody is in the best interest of a child.
(2) The court may order joint legal custody if it determines that:
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody;
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(b) joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child; and
(c) both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody.
(3) In determining the best interest of a child, the court shall consider the
following factors:
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development of the child will benefit from joint legal custody;
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the
child and reach shared decisions in the child's best interest;
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive relationship between the child and the other parent;
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the
filing of the suit;
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents;
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older, any preference of the child for
or against joint legal custody; and
(g) any other factors the court finds relevant.
(4) The determination of the best interest of the child shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.
(5) The court shall inform both parties that an order for joint custody may
preclude eligibility for public assistance in the form of aid to families with
dependent children, and that if public assistance is required for the support of
children of the parties at any time subsequent to an order of joint legal custody, the order may be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4.
(6) The court may recommend that where possible the parties attempt to
settle future disputes by a dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement or modification of the terms and conditions of the order of joint legal
custody through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring ex parte
orders to protect the child.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 106, § 3.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, ch. 106 be-

30-3-10.3.

comes effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Terms of joint legal custody order.

(1) An order of joint legal custody shall provide terms the court determines
appropriate, which may include specifying:
(a) either the county of residence of the child, until altered by further
order of the court, or the custodian who has the sole legal right to determine the residence of the child;
(b) that the parents shall exchange information concerning the health,
education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before
making decisions concerning any of these areas;
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's present
and future physical care, support, and education;
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the child's attendance at school
and other activities, his daily routine, and his association with friends;
and
(e) as necessary the remaining parental rights, privileges, duties, and
powers to be exercised by the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly.
(2) The court shall, where possible, include in the order the terms agreed to
between the parties.
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(3) Any parental rights not specifically addressed by the court order may be
exercised by the parent having physical custody of the child the majority of
the time.
(4) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians does not impair or limit
the authority of the court to order support of the child, including payments by one custodian to the other.
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is not grounds for modifying a support order.
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute resolution procedure the parties
agree to use before seeking enforcement or modification of the terms and
conditions of the order of joint legal custody through litigation, except in
emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the child.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.3, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 106, § 4.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, ch. 106 be-

comes effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of order.
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians the court may,
after a hearing, modify an order that established joint legal custody if:
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be modified, or the order has become unworkable or inappropriate under existing
circumstances; and
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the decree would be an
improvement for and in the best interest of the child.
(2) (a) The order of joint legal custody is terminated upon the filing of a
motion for termination by:
(i) both parents; or
(ii) one parent, when notice of the motion is sent by certified mail
to the other parent and an affidavit is filed with the motion, indicating the motion has been mailed as required by this subsection.
(b) The order of joint legal custody shall be replaced by the court with
an order of sole legal custody under Section 30-3-10. All related issues,
including visitation and child support, shall also be determined and ordered by the court.
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered
frivolously and in a manner designed to harass the other party, the court shall
assess attorney's fees as costs against the offending party.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 106, § 5.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, ch. 106 be-

30-3-10.5. Payments
mony.

comes effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

of support, maintenance,

and ali-

Unless the order or decree providing for support, maintenance, or alimony
under this chapter or Chapter 4, Title 30, provides a different time for payment, all monthly payments of support, maintenance, or alimony provided for
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in the order or decree shall be due one-half by the 5th day of each month, and
the remaining one-half by the 20th day of that month.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 78, § 1.

30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order ment.

Judg-

(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child
support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the
date it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a
district court, except as provided in Subsection (2);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any
other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the
petitioner.
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a state or political
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be effective and enforceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party relying
on the public record, shall be reduced to an administrative or judicial judgment for a specific amount and docketed in the district court in accordance
with Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-309.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.6, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 117, § 1; 1988, ch. 1, § 3; 1988, ch.
203, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1988 amendment, by Chapter 1, effective January 19,

1988, in the introductory paragraph of Subsec(1)
substituted
"62A-11-401" for
tion
"78-45d-l."
The 1988 amendment, by Chapter 203, effective April 25, 1988, added Subsection (4).

30-3-11. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 30-3-11 (L. 1957, ch. 55,

§ 2), declaring a public policy to foster marital

and family relationships,
Laws 1961, ch. 59, § 2.

30-3-11.1. Family Court Act -

was repealed by

Purpose.

It is the public policy of the state of Utah to strengthen the family life
foundation of our society and reduce the social and economic costs to the state
resulting from broken homes and to take reasonable measures to preserve
marriages, particularly where minor children are involved. The purposes of
this act are to protect the rights of children and to promote the public welfare
by preserving and protecting family life and the institution of matrimony by
providing the courts with further assistance for family counseling, the recon484
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ciliation of spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic and family controversies.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-11.1, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 8.
Meaning of "this act." - Laws 1969, ch. 72
amended §§ 30-3-1, 30-3-4 to 30-3-8, 30-3-10,

30-3-12, and 30-3-17, repealed § 30-3-9, and
enacted this section and §§ 30-3-11.2,
30-3-13.1, 30-3-14.1, 30-3-15.1 to 30-3-15.4,
and 30-3-16.1 to 30-3-17.1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - The Family Court
Act, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 106.
New approaches of Psychiatry: Implications
for Divorce Reform, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 191.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation § 339.
C.J.S. - 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 131.
Key Numbers. - Divorce 4P 87.5.

30-3-11.2. Appointment of counsel for child.
If, in any action before any court of this state involving the custody or
support of a child, it shall appear in the best interests of the child to have a
separate exposition of the issues and personal representation for the child, the
court may appoint counsel to represent the child throughout the action, and
the attorney's fee for such representation may be taxed as a cost of the action.
History: C. 1953, § 30-3-11.2, enacted by
L. 1969, ch. 72, § 9.

Cross-References. - Guardians ad litem
in juvenile court, § 78-3a-44.5.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - The Utah Marriage
Counseling Experiment: An Account of

Changes in Divorce Law and Procedure, 7
Utah L. Rev. 443 (1961).

30-3-12. Courts to exercise family counseling

powers.

Each district court of the respective judicial districts, while sitting in matters of divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, child custody, alimony and
support in connection therewith, child custody in habeas corpus proceedings,
and adoptions, shall exercise the family counseling powers conferred by this
act.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-12, enacted by L.
1957, ch. 55, § 2; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 10.

30-3-13. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 30-3-13 (L. 1957, ch. 55,

§ 2), relating to domestic relations counselors,

was repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 59, § 2. For
present provisions, see § 30-3-15.2.
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30-3-13.1. Establishment
trict court.

of family court division of dis-

A family court division of the district court may be established with the
consent of the county commission in a county in which the district court
determines that the social conditions in the county and the number of domestic relations cases in the courts require use of the procedures provided for in
this act in order to give full and proper consideration to such cases and to
effectuate the purposes of this act. The determination shall be made annually
by the judge of the district court in counties having only one judge, and by a
majority of the judges of the district court in counties having more than one
judge.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-13.1, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 11.

Cross-References. - District courts, Chapter 3 of Title 78.

30-3-14. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 30-3-14 (L. 1957, ch. 55,

§ 2), relating to domestic relations counselors,

was repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 59, § 2. For
present provisions, see § 30-3-15.2.

30-3-14.1. Designation of judges -

Terms.

In a county within a judicial district having more than one judge of the
district court but having a population of less than 300,000 and in which the
district court has established a family court division, the presiding judge of
such court shall annually, in the month of September, designate at least one
_ judge to hear all cases under this act. In a county within a judicial district
having more than one judge of the district court and having a population of
more than 300,000 and in which the district court has established a family
court division, the presiding judge of such court shall annually, in the month
of September, designate at least two judges to hear all cases under this act,
and shall designate one of such judges as the presiding judge of such family
court division. Such judge or judges shall serve on the family court division
not less than one year and devote their time primarily to divorce and other
domestic relations cases.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-14.1, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 12.

30-3-15. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 30-3-15 (L. 1957, ch. 55,

§ 2), relating to domestic relations counselors,

was repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 59, § 2. For
present provisions, see § 30-3-15.2.
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30-3-15.1. Appointment of domestic relations counselors,
family court commissioner, and assistants and
clerks.
In each county having a population of less than 300,000 and in which the
district court has established a family court division the district court judge or
judges may, and in each county having a population of more than 300,000 and
in which the district court has established a family court division the district
court judges shall, by an order filed in the office of the clerk on or before July 1
of each year, appoint one or more domestic relations counselors, an attorney of
recognized ability and standing at the bar as family court commissioner, and
such other persons as assistants and clerks as may be necessary, to serve
during the pleasure of the appointing power.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-15.1, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 13.

30-3-15.2. Domestic relations counselors -

Powers.

Domestic relations counselors shall have the power to:
(1) Hold conciliation conferences with persons who are parties to a
petition for conciliation and with parties in actions for divorce, annulment or separate maintenance who may be referred by the court in such
actions.
(2) Test and evaluate all persons coming before them and either hold
further conferences with them or refer them to agencies or resources for
further conferences and counseling. Domestic relations counselors shall
report to the court on each case referred, advising as to the number of
conferences attended by the parties and whether a reconciliation has been
or is likely to be effected.
(3) Conduct investigations and make reports as the court may direct
regarding the award of custody or placement of children, either in predivorce or post-divorce matters. When a request for an investigation has
been joined in or agreed to by both parties a report shall be filed with the
court and received as evidence, subject to the right of either party to
cross-examine the person making the report.
(4) Keep records, compile statistics and make reports as the court may
direct.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-15.2, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 14.

30-3-15.3. Commissioners

-

Powers.

Family court commissioners shall have power to:
(1) Secure compliance with court orders.
(2) Serve as judge pro tempore, master or referee on assignment of the
court, and with the written consent of the parties to hear orders to show
cause where no contempt is alleged, default divorces where the parties
have had marriage counseling but there has been no reconciliation, uncontested actions under the Uniform Act on Paternity, actions under the
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Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act and actions under the Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act.
(3) Represent the interest of children in divorce or annulment actions,
and of the parties in appropriate cases.
(4) Act with the domestic relations counselors in the screening and
referral of applicants for counseling.
(5) Assist the domestic relations counselors in custody investigations
and the presentation, where necessary, of their reports to the court.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-15.3, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 15.
Cross-References. - Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, §§ 77-31-1 to 77-31-39.

Uniform Act on Paternity, §§ 78-45a-1 to
78-45a-17.
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
§§ 78-45-1 to 78-45-13.

30-3-15.4. Salaries and expenses.
Salaries of persons appointed under the foregoing sections shall be fixed by
the board of commissioners of the county in which they serve. Office space,
furnishings, equipment and supplies for family court commissioners and conciliation staff shall be provided by the board of county commissioners. The
expenses and salaries of family court commissioners and conciliation staff
shall be paid from county funds under Section 17-16-7.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-15.4, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 16.

30-3-16. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 30-3-16 (L. 1957, ch. 55,

§ 2), relating to domestic relations counselors,

was repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 59, § 2. For
present provisions, see § 30-3-15.2.

30-3-16.1. Jurisdiction of family court division - Powers.
Whenever any controversy exists between spouses which may, unless a
reconciliation is achieved, result in the dissolution or annulment of the marriage or in the disruption of the household, and there is a child of the spouses
or either of them under the age of 17 years whose welfare might be affected,
the family court division of the district court shall have jurisdiction over the
controversy, over the parties and over all persons having any relation to the
controversy and may compel attendance before the court or a domestic relations counselor of the parties or other persons related to the controversy. The
court may make orders in divorce or conciliation proceeding as it deems necessary for the protection of the family interests.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-16.1, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 17.
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30-3-16.2. Petition for conciliation.
Prior to the filing of any action for divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance, either spouse or both spouses may file a petition for conciliation in the
family court division invoking the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of
preserving the marriage by effecting a reconciliation between the parties or
an amicable settlement of the controversy between them so as to avoid litigation over the issues involved.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-16.2, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 18.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation § 339.

C.J.S. - 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 131.
Key Numbers. - Divorce .., 87.5.

30-3-16.3. Contents of petition.
The petition for conciliation shall state:
•
(1) A controversy exists between the spouses and request the aid of the
court to effect a reconciliation or an amicable settlement of the controversy.
(2) The name and age of each child under the age of 17 years whose
welfare may be affected by the controversy.
(3) The name and address of the petitioner or the names and addresses
of the petitioners.
(4) If the petition is filed by one spouse only, the name and address of
the other spouse as a respondent.
(5) The name, as a respondent, of any other person who has any relation to the controversy and, if known to the petitioners, the address of
such person.
(6) Such other information as the court may by rule require.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-16.3, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 19.

30-3-16.4. Procedure upon filing of petition.
When a petition for conciliation is filed in the family court division of the
district court, the court shall refer the matter to the domestic relations counselor or counselors and shall cause notice to be given to the spouses, by mail or
in a form prescribed by the court, of the filing of the petition and of the time
and place of any hearing, conference or other proceeding scheduled by the
court or domestic relations counselors under this act.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-16.4, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 20.
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30-3-16.5. Fees.
The court may fix fees to be charged for filing a petition for conciliation and
for use of the courts' counseling services.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-16.5, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 21.

30-3-16.6. Information not available to public.
Neither the names of petitioners nor respondents, nor the contents of petitions for conciliation filed under this act, shall be available or open to public
inquiry, except that an attorney for a person seeking to file an action for
divorce, annulment or separate maintenance may determine from the clerk of
the court if the other spouse has filed a petition for conciliation.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-16.6, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 22.

30-3-16.7. Effect of petition -

Pendency of action.

The filing of a petition for conciliation under this act shall, for a period of 60
days thereafter, act as a bar to the filing by either spouse of an action for
divorce, annulment of marriage or separate maintenance unless the court
otherwise orders. The pendency of an action for divorce, annulment of marriage or separate maintenance shall not prevent either party to the action
from filing a petition for conciliation under this act, either on his own or at the
request and direction of the court as authorized by Section 30-3-17; and the
filing of a petition for conciliation shall stay for a period of 60 days, unless the
court otherwise orders, any trial or default hearing upon the complaint. However, when the judge of the family court division is advised in writing by a
marriage counselor to whom a petition for conciliation has been referred that
a reconciliation of the parties cannot be effected, the bar to filing an action or
the stay of trial or default hearing shall be removed.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-16.7, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 23.

30-3-17. Power and jurisdiction of judge.
The judge of a district court may counsel either spouse or both and may in
his discretion require one or both of them to appear before him and, in those
counties where a domestic relations counselor has been appointed pursuant to
this act, require them to file a petition for conciliation and to appear before
such counselor, or may recommend the aid of a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, social service worker or other specialists or scientific expert, or the
pastor, bishop or presiding officer of any religious denomination to which the
parties may belong. The power and jurisdiction granted by this act shall be in
addition to that presently exercised by the district courts and shall not be in
limitation thereof.
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History: C. 1953, 30-3-16.7, enacted by L
1969, ch. 72, § 23.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Application of act.
Family Court Act did not apply to action for
custody after an out-of-state divorce; thus,
court properly found mother to be a proper person to have custody of the child, even though

husband had requested evaluation of both parties by the Salt Lake Mental Health Division,
and the mother refused to participate, and was
never required to submit to evaluation. Mark
v. Mark, 531 P.2d 490 (Utah 1975).

30-3-17.1. Proceedings deemed confidential
evaluation by counselor.

-

Written

The petition for conciliation and all communications, verbal or written,
from the parties to the domestic relations counselors or other personnel of the
conciliation department in counseling or conciliation proceedings shall be
deemed to be made in official confidence within the meaning of Section
78-24-8 and shall not be admissible or usable for any purpose in any divorce
hearing or other proceeding. However, the marriage counselor may submit to
the appropriate court a written evaluation of the prospects or prognosis of a
particular marriage without divulging facts or revealing confidential disclosures.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-17.1, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 25.

30-3-18. Waiting period for hearing after filing for divorce
- Use of counseling service not to be construed
as condonation.
Unless the court, for good cause shown and set forth in the findings, otherwise orders, no hearing for decree of divorce shall be held by the court until 90
days shall have elapsed from the filing of the complaint, provided the court
may make such interim orders as may be just and equitable.
The use of counseling services provided under this act shall not be construed
as a condonation on the part of either spouse of acts that may constitute
grounds for divorce.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-18, enacted by L.
1957, ch. 55, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Notice not required.
Waiting period.
Waiver of waiting period.
Notice not required.
Defendant husband who had not answered
complaint and was in default was not entitled
to notice or hearing on court decision to enter
final decree seven days before the end of the

90-day statutory period. Heath v. Heath, 541
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1975).
Waiting period.
Trial court had discretion to enter final decree of divorce 83 days after date of filing of
complaint, where defendant husband did not
answer complaint, used drugs to excess, and
was jailed, and there was no basis for reconciliation. Heath v. Heath 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah
1975).

491

30-3-19

HUSBAND AND WIFE

Although trial court's use of phrase "threemonth waiting period" was an error in form,
nevertheless the intent (90-day period) was
clear, and the error did not prejudice plaintiff
to extent of justifying vacation of six-year-old
divorce decree. Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d
931 (Utah 1979).

30-3-19 to 30-3-22.

Waiver of waiting period.
Plaintiffs explicit, written statement declaring himself in default and consenting to divorce decree at any time without further notice
to him abundantly justified the trial court's
waiver of the 90-day waiting period. Howard v.
Howard, 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 1979).

Repealed.

Repeals. - Sections 30-3-19 to 30-3-22 (L.
1957, ch. 55, § 2), relating to the confidential
nature of counseling proceedings, power of
judge to protect privacy, study of family rela-

tions by domestic relations counselor and delinquency in support or alimony payments,
were repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 59, § 2.

CHAPTER 4
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
Section
30-4-1.
30-4-2.
30-4-3.

30-4-1.

Action by spouse - Grounds.
Procedure - Venue.
Custody and maintenance of children - Property division and support payments.

Action by spouse

-

Section
30-4-4.
30-4-5.

Restraining disposal of property.
Rights and remedies - Imprisonment of husband or wife.

Grounds.

Whenever a resident of this state shall have deserted a spouse without good
and sufficient cause, or being of sufficient ability to provide support shall have
neglected or refused to properly provide for and suitably maintain that
spouse, or having property within this state and the spouse being a resident of
this state shall have so deserted or neglected or refused to provide such support or where a married person without that person's fault lives separate and
apart from that spouse, the district court shall, on the filing of a complaint
therefor, allot, assign, set apart and decree as alimony the use of such part of
the real and personal estate or earnings of the deserting spouse as the court
may determine in its discretion; and during the pendency of the proceedings
the court may require that deserting spouse to pay such sums for costs, expenses and attorneys' fees, and for the support of either spouse, as it shall
deem necessary and proper in the same manner as in actions for divorce.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1216;
C.L. 1917, § 3010; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
40-4-1; L. 1977, ch. 122, § 6.

Cross-References. - Conciliation petition,
filing as temporary bar to filing action for separate maintenance, § 30-3-16.7.
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